



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

MAR 15 2010

The Honorable Ike Skelton
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your February 22, 2010 letter concerning Army's Base Operating Services (BOS) Account for Fiscal Year (FY) 2010. I appreciate the opportunity to address your concerns about our plans to mitigate the FY10 funding shortfall.

The Army will conduct a comprehensive mid-year review of all BOS accounts to ensure adequate funding of Army priorities through the remainder of the fiscal year. The Army senior leadership is committed to looking for efficiencies and best practices in the use of BOS funds, but we will not shortchange Soldiers and their Families in the process.

As I stated in testimony on February 25, 2010, I want to make it clear that, as our installations look for ways to operate more efficiently, Family programs will be sacrosanct. They will not be touched. We will change where change is required and we will direct money to where it has the best value. But, as I said, "No Army Families will be left behind."

Currently, no Reductions in Force actions are planned as a result of year-of-execution funding deficits. Installation Management Command is making every effort to mitigate funding shortfalls through developing efficiencies and streamlining services delivery. This may include some adjustments to its workforce by way of redistributing workloads, seeking other sourcing solutions, and reducing some lower-priority capabilities. In the unlikely event that Reductions in Force actions become necessary, we will provide proper notification to Congress.


The Army will maintain training priorities and Soldiers' activities in support of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model, including reset/dwell time. Installation Management Command has endorsed the use of Borrowed Military Manpower (BMM) and Troop Diversion to provide installation service support as long as Commanders maintain operational requirements and preserve Soldiers' dwell time at home station. Garrisons, in coordination with their Mission Commanders, consider the use of BMM when temporary excess capacity exists, such as when Soldiers are awaiting the start of training or when the mission provides training value (e.g., law enforcement or guard duty). The decision to use BMM is also based upon their respective missions, fiscal posture, and the Commander's assessment of the installation needs.

Printed on Recycled Paper

We believe our All-Volunteer Force is truly a national treasure. It is the Army's number one priority to support critical family and quality-of-life programs for our Soldiers and our Families. As such, we look forward to working with you to ensure that the Army's FY10 and FY11 funding strategies for installation services provide support for ARFORGEN requirements and fully fund the Army Family Covenant and Life, Health and Safety programs.

Thank you for your inquiry into this matter and for your continued support of our Soldiers and their Families.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John M. McHugh". The signature is stylized with a large, looped initial "J" and a long, sweeping underline that extends to the right.

John M. McHugh



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
 ACQUISITION LOGISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY
 103 ARMY PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON DC 20310-0103

The Honorable Carl Levin
 Chairman
 Committee on Armed Services
 United States Senate
 Washington, DC 20510

Dear Chairman Levin:

Thank you for letter regarding Section 852 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2007, which prohibits the Department of Defense (DoD) from paying pass-through charges on contracts or subcontracts that are excessive in relation to the cost of the work performed by the relevant contractor or subcontractor.


As requested, please find attached, a document identifying the indefinite delivery, and the indefinite quantity contract or task orders awarded by the U.S. Army with a value in excess of \$100 million, under which services are being provided in support of operations in Afghanistan or Iraq as of April 6, 2010 and contracts or task orders where the Army expects more than 70 percent of the work to be subcontracted. This document includes the identified order, the date the contract was awarded, the name of the contractor, the value of the contract and a description of the services to be provided.

To preclude the U.S. Army and other military services from paying excessive pass-through charges, in April 2007, the DoD issued an interim rule amending the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Supplement to Implement Section 852 of the NDAA for FY 2007. This interim rule contains a solicitation provision and a contract clause requiring offerors and contractors to identify the percentage of work they will subcontract. When subcontracted costs exceed 70 percent of the total cost of work to be performed, the contractor is required to provide information on indirect costs and profit and value added with regard to the subcontract work.

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense released a memorandum dated December 23, 2009, directing contracting officers to adhere to the new FAR interim rule on limiting excessive pass-through charges. The first provisions stated that all contracting officers will use FAR 15.408(n)(2)(i)(B), Solicitation provisions and contract clauses; 31.203(i), Indirect Costs; 52.215-22, Limitations on Pass-Through Charges – Identification of Subcontract Effort; and 52.215-23, Limitations on Pass-Through Charges. Secondly, a deviation was implemented from FAR 15.408(n)(2)(i)(B)(2), which includes an exception for fixed-price incentive contracts awarded on the basis of adequate price competition. The Army expeditiously implemented these changes in all solicitations and contracts are tracked in a database to ensure compliance by all contracting centers.

I would gladly meet with you at your convenience to discuss this or other contracting matters. Thank you for your interest in the Army, our Soldiers, and their equipment.

Sincerely,


Edward M. Harrington
Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Army (Procurement)

Enclosure

PARC - Office	Contract Number	Type of Contract Awarded (indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contract or task order)	Value of Contract	Where services are being provided - Afghanistan or Iraq	Percentage of Contract to be Subcontracted	Date Contract Awarded	Name of Contractor	Description of Services Provided
(b) (6) PEO STRI	W900KK-07-D-0001; WarFighter Focus	ID-IQ Contract	\$2.7B; ceiling of \$11.2B	CONUS, OCONUS, Afghanistan and Iraq	70%	8-Jun-07	Raytheon Technical Services	World wide training support services
CO (b) (6) JCC VA Afghanistan	W91B4M-06-D-4000	IDIQ	\$233M	Afghanistan	90%	19-Dec-07	PAE (RM Asia)	Vehicle Repair/Maint
	W91B4N-09-D-5006	IDIQ	\$360M	Afghanistan	80%	15-Mar-09	TBI FHI JV	Afghan Host Nation Trucking
	W91B4N-09-D-5005	IDIQ	\$360M	Afghanistan	90%	15-Mar-09	NCL Holdings	Afghan Host Nation Trucking
	W91B4N-09-D-5001	IDIQ	\$360M	Afghanistan	75%	15-Mar-09	The Sandi Group	Afghan Host Nation Trucking



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON
1600 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1600

JUL 22 2010

100611602

(no enclosures)
in case file

The Honorable Edolphus Towns
Chairman
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:


Secretary of the Army McHugh asked me to respond on his behalf to your letter of June 4, 2010, requesting documents on the contract awarded to Serco, Incorporated, under the U.S. Army's Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), and a briefing to your staff.

On June 25, 2010, Mr. Mike Hutchison, Director of the Rock Island Contracting Center; Ms. Kathryn Szymanski, Army Sustainment Command Counsel; and Ms. Lynne Klarkowski, LOGCAP representative, briefed several professional staff members on the Serco LOGCAP support contract. Following this briefing, the Army Sustainment Command completed its search for documents responsive to your request. A disk containing 1,715 pages of documents responsive to your request is enclosed and contains the original Statement of Work (SOW), amendments, modifications, and task orders.

The enclosed documents contain sensitive information and are subject to the disclosure provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552) and the Trade Secrets Act (18 U.S.C. § 1905). The Army has consistently taken the position that such proprietary and information must be properly safeguarded. These documents are provided with a full reservation of rights and with the understanding and intent that such provision shall not be deemed a waiver of any applicable privilege. We respectfully request that these documents be shared only within your Committee and then only with those who have an official need for the information, that the documents not be disclosed outside the Committee or to the public, that appropriate steps be taken to safeguard these documents, and that the documents be destroyed after use.

I trust that this information is helpful. Thank you for your continued support for our Soldiers and Army.

Sincerely,


James C. McConville
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Legislative Liaison

Enclosure:
Supporting Documentation
Copy Furnished:
The Honorable Darrell Issa
Ranking Member
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
 ACQUISITION LOGISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY
 103 ARMY PENTAGON
 WASHINGTON DC 20310-0103

The Honorable Carl Levin
 Chairman
 Committee on Armed Services
 United States Senate
 Washington, DC 20510

Dear Chairman Levin:

Thank you for letter regarding Section 852 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2007, which prohibits the Department of Defense (DoD) from paying pass-through charges on contracts or subcontracts that are excessive in relation to the cost of the work performed by the relevant contractor or subcontractor.


As requested, please find attached, a document identifying the indefinite delivery, and the indefinite quantity contract or task orders awarded by the U.S. Army with a value in excess of \$100 million, under which services are being provided in support of operations in Afghanistan or Iraq as of April 6, 2010 and contracts or task orders where the Army expects more than 70 percent of the work to be subcontracted. This document includes the identified order, the date the contract was awarded, the name of the contractor, the value of the contract and a description of the services to be provided.

To preclude the U.S. Army and other military services from paying excessive pass-through charges, in April 2007, the DoD issued an interim rule amending the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Supplement to implement Section 852 of the NDAA for FY 2007. This interim rule contains a solicitation provision and a contract clause requiring offerors and contractors to identify the percentage of work they will subcontract. When subcontracted costs exceed 70 percent of the total cost of work to be performed, the contractor is required to provide information on indirect costs and profit and value added with regard to the subcontract work.

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I would gladly meet with you at your convenience to discuss this or other contracting matters. Thank you for your interest in the Army, our Soldiers, and their equipment.

Sincerely,


Edward M. Harrington
Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Army (Procurement)

Enclosure

100813992



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON
1600 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1600

0 8 JAN 2011

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have been asked to respond on behalf of Secretary of the Army John M. McHugh to your August 23, 2010, letter regarding allegations that Soldiers at Fort Eustis, Virginia, were punished for declining to attend a spiritual fitness concert on May 13, 2010. This letter is a follow-up to the interim response my office provided on October 8, 2010.

The U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) investigation appointed by the Deputy Commander, Lieutenant General John E. Sterling, on August 23, 2010 is now complete. The investigation found that the concert and the Fort Eustis spiritual fitness program as a whole were planned and conducted in compliance with applicable law and regulations. Soldiers were not directed to attend the concert; however, Soldiers in one company who did not attend performed routine, daily barracks maintenance until the Soldiers who did attend returned from the concert. The Soldiers who did not attend the concert were not "locked down" or "banished" to the barracks, although they were not permitted to use cell phones, computers, or video games while conducting barracks maintenance. Nevertheless, this practice violated a TRADOC regulation, which requires that Soldiers be allowed personal time activities, not to include barracks maintenance, as an alternative to religious activities or programs.


The investigation concluded that this violation was not deliberate, but resulted from a miscommunication between the Soldiers' company commander and the non-commissioned officer in charge on May 13. The investigation found that the Soldiers' concerns were quickly raised to the command's leaders, who took prompt action to address the situation. On May 14, the company commander met with the affected Soldiers, publicly apologized for the miscommunication, and released the affected Soldiers from barracks maintenance that evening, while Soldiers who attended the concert the night before performed those duties.

Lieutenant General Sterling approved the investigation and directed extensive re-training and a review of current TRADOC policies on participation in religious activities. Lieutenant General Sterling took no adverse personnel action against the officers and Soldiers involved; instead, he referred the matter to their supervisors for appropriate action.

-2-

Thank you for your interest in this matter and for your continued support to our Soldiers and our Army.

Sincerely,


James C. McConville
Major General, US Army
Chief of Legislative Liaison

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON
1600 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1600

DEC 10 2010

The Honorable Ike Skelton, Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Chairman Skelton:

I have been asked to respond on behalf of Secretary of the Army John M. McHugh to your November 18, 2010 letter requesting personnel files for Army officers reprimanded following an ambush near the village of Ganjgal, Afghanistan, on September 8, 2009.


Three officers were reprimanded for their actions or failures to act in support of coalition forces engaged at Ganjgal. The acting battalion commander received a permanently filed administrative reprimand. The acting battalion operations officer received a locally filed administrative reprimand. The battalion battle captain received a permanently-filed administrative reprimand.

Enclosed please find official military personnel files for the acting battalion commander and the battalion battle captain. We have yet to receive the battle captain's officer evaluation reports. Those will follow under separate cover. The acting battalion operations officer's locally filed reprimand was destroyed upon his departure from the unit. Because his official file does not contain the reprimand, based on guidance from your staff, we are not transmitting that file. Please note we have redacted social security numbers from these files.

The enclosed documents contain sensitive personal information subject to the nondisclosure provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. §552) and the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. §552a). These officers have not consented to the public release of their names. The Army provides these documents with a full reservation of rights and with the understanding and intent that this provision is not a waiver to assert any applicable privilege. We respectfully request that these documents, including the officers' names, be shared within the Committee only with those who have an official need for the information, that the documents, names, and information not be disclosed to any members of the public, including constituents, that appropriate steps are taken to safeguard the documents, and that the documents are destroyed after Committee use.

My point of contact for this action is Major (b) (6)

Sincerely,


James C. McConville
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief of Legislative Liaison

Copy Furnished:
The Honorable Howard "Buck" McKeon, Ranking Member
House Committee on Armed Services



110110234

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON
1800 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1800

JAN 25 2011

The Honorable Howard "Buck" McKeon
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Secretary of the Army has asked me to respond on his behalf to your December 22, 2010 letter requesting additional documents and information concerning the combat engagement at Wanat, Afghanistan in 2008.

In response to your request, enclosed are the following:


- (1) The additional materials submitted by the chain of command to General Campbell during the course of his review of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) reinvestigation of the combat engagement at Wanat. This submission includes briefing slides, fragmentary orders, manual excerpts, cost summaries, diagrams, and personal statements submitted by or on behalf of the chain of command as part of their due process rights. It does not include any legal advice given during the process.
- (2) The documents referenced in (1) above, minus the personal statements submitted by or on behalf of the chain of command as part of their due process rights, are also responsive to your paragraph (2) request for government-produced documents provided to or considered by the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, in connection with the Combat Studies Institute's (CSI) 2010 report. The CSI study further includes extensive footnotes, endnotes, and a bibliography detailing the documents and the resources considered in drafting the final product, including both the CENTCOM reinvestigation and GEN Campbell's review that were previously provided to the House Armed Services Committee. Personal statements from the officers and letters of support provided as part of due process were not provided to CSI. However, CSI had contact with the chain of command during the study.
- (3) An early draft of the CSI study of this engagement done by Mr. (b) (6). Please note that this draft is not a final product and subsequent authors had access to more information than Mr. (b) (6) did.
- (4) The Criminal Investigation Division results of its fact gathering inquiry into unspecified actions by Soldiers of the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry Regiment (Airborne) (without the classified and unclassified attachments).

- (5) The July 29, 2009 Department of the Army Inspector General report containing recommended follow-on actions from this engagement.

The enclosed documents contain sensitive information and are subject to the disclosure provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. § 552) and the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a). The Army provides these documents for committee use only with a full reservation of rights and with the understanding and intent that such provision shall not be deemed a waiver to assert any applicable privilege. The Army respectfully requests that these documents be shared only with committee members who have an official need for the information, that the documents not be disclosed to the public, and that the documents are destroyed after use. If your committee wishes to disclose these documents to the public, prior coordination with the Army is requested so that the Army can review and provide a publicly releasable version.

I trust that this information is helpful. Thank you for your continued support of our Soldiers and Army.

Sincerely,



B. Don Farris
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Deputy Chief of Legislative Liaison

4 Enclosures

Copy furnished w/o enclosures:
The Honorable Adam Smith
Ranking Member

110112154



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

FEB 10 2011

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your January 7, 2011 letter expressing concerns regarding EOD Technology, Incorporated (EODT). I have reviewed the circumstances surrounding your inquiry of EODT's performance, public statements, and the composition of the Army's Private Security Contracts (PSC) working group.

As Secretary Gates mentioned in his December 14, 2010 response to your initial concerns about EODT, I can assure you that the important insights into EODT's operations and performance referenced in your committee's report will be considered in connection with future procurements for which EODT is an offeror.

To highlight the criticality of evaluating past performance records of PSCs, the Commanding General of the U.S. Central Command Joint Theater Support Contracting Command (C-JTSCC) issued a memorandum to the Principal Assistants Responsible for Contracting on January 15, 2011 reminding them of the importance of considering past performance when awarding PSC contracts. This memorandum is also included on the C-JTSCC website <http://c3-training.net/new.html>, and informs current and future offerors, as well as contracting officers, that past performance information will be sought from existing databases, other Government entities (to include Government reports) and private sector sources. A copy of the memorandum is enclosed for your reference.

In his December 14, 2010 response to your inquiry, Secretary Gates raised his concerns about inconsistent statements made by EODT management. I am also concerned about these inconsistencies; however, I am sure you appreciate that the Army does not respond to corporate press releases or public relations actions meant for public consumption. Rather than comment on EODT's public statements, the appropriate means to address a firm's performance is through the contracting officer. The concerns with EODT's performance, as documented in the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) report, occurred several years ago. Subsequently, substantial risk reduction efforts have been implemented and current contract performance by EODT has been fully successful. Thus, no efforts have been made to communicate with EODT management to address the previous concerns.

To address your concerns about the appropriateness of an EODT consultant serving on the PSC working group, let me assure you that no contractors were members of the PSC working group. The working group was established with the goal of crafting effective solutions to the issues presented in the SASC and other reports. To this end, the working group received briefings and participated in discussions with a variety of subject matter experts. These subject matter experts included representatives from the SASC staff, an investigator from the House Oversight and Government Reform Committee, contractor personnel who had experience in performing PSC efforts, and Ambassador Dell Dailey (Lieutenant General, Retired) who is an EODT consultant.


Ambassador Dailey was subcontracted on an Army contract to provide subject matter briefings to the PSC working group. Ambassador Dailey signed a non-disclosure agreement to ensure that he did not provide non-public information to EODT or any other consulting clients. Ambassador Dailey served as the former Director of the Center for Special Operations, United States Special Operations Command, and former U.S. Department of State Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism. His operational experience in counterterrorism in Afghanistan, as well as his understanding of PSC firms, gives him a unique perspective combining a senior tactical commander's experience as well as the PSC industry perspective.

None of the contractor personnel who served as subject matter experts were stakeholders in the decision-making process for the working group, nor will they be provided the opportunity to comment on the final report of the PSC working group.

It is anticipated that the report will include the improvements already implemented into the contracting processes and identify other improvements that will help to mitigate the problems highlighted by the SASC. This was not an investigative body and it will not address the causes or the facts related to prior contract actions or errors.

Thank you for your continued support of our Soldiers and for your commitment to contracting excellence.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John M. McHugh", with a stylized flourish at the end.

John M. McHugh

Enclosure



110213465

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON
MAR 22 2011

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your letter dated February 17, 2011 regarding the Army's in-sourcing program and in particular, my February 1, 2011 memorandum regarding in-sourcing approval authority.

The Army remains committed to in-sourcing as a component of total workforce management. It is a tool that remains critical to our human capital planning. The Army continues to comply with the annual contractor inventory review and will take appropriate action based on those reviews.

The purpose of the February 1, 2011 policy is to ensure that civilian authorizations due to in-sourcing are added only after a thorough assessment of whether work can be eliminated, absorbed by the existing in-house workforce or whether it is feasible to shift existing manpower resources from lower priority activities. The analysis outlined in the February 1, 2011 memorandum and its implementing guidance only reflects the long-standing statutory requirement that civilian authorizations must be based on workload and available funds. Merely duplicating contractor staffing levels without workload validation would be fiscally irresponsible. The policy simply elevates approval for in-sourcing to my level.

I personally reviewed the implementing guidance and believe that it complies with all applicable laws. My February 1, 2011 memorandum does not relieve the Army from its statutory obligations. No one has the authority to disapprove any in-sourcing proposal before it is presented to me. I am the sole authority for both approvals and disapprovals of all in-sourcing proposals as well as any requests for exceptions to the policy. Thus, I can assure you that the implementing guidance will be administered so that we are in full compliance with the law.

Thank you for your interest in this matter and for your continued support for our Army.

Sincerely,

John M. McHugh



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON DC

APR 11 2011

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Levin:

Thank you for your March 11, 2011, letter regarding the Army's operational energy program. As we discussed during the Army Posture hearing, I share your concerns that the Army's reliance upon fossil fuels presents a strategic, tactical and operational risk to Soldiers and to our Nation. Although the Army continues to aggressively expand our operational energy efforts, it is clear that we need to do more. Accordingly, we have significantly enhanced our comprehensive energy program.

In December 2010, I assigned the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Energy and Sustainability to serve as the Army's Senior Energy Executive (SEE), reporting to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Energy and Environment. I expanded the duties of the SEE to include Operational Energy, establishing for the first time a lead for Operational Energy policy in the Army.

In concert, I directed the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's Director, Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC), to increase efforts on operational energy strategy and requirements development, including development of an integrated campaign plan. ARCIC has already established operational direction by completing a key strategy and an Initial Capabilities Document for Operational Energy.

Moreover, I have asked the Assistant Secretary for Installations Energy and Environment to expedite the testing/fielding of key technologies that not only meet the needs of our Soldiers but also support energy security and sustainability.

Finally, I have enclosed a status update of both the specific programs you referenced in your letter, and other steps the Army is taking to improve our operational energy posture. I look forward to working with you as we pursue more efficient, agile and sustainable energy initiatives.

Thank you for your inquiry into this matter and your continued support of our Army.

Sincerely,

John M. McHugh

Enclosure

Army Operational Energy Initiatives

The Army is committed to instituting energy saving measures throughout our operations in both theater and garrison. The Army works very closely with our Sister Services to jointly develop, review and field key energy saving systems.

1. The Solar Portable Alternative Communications Energy System (SPACES) is a small-scale, deployable, flexible solar panel that is used to connect and power communications devices. This system was adapted by the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) from an Army system called Rucksack Enhanced Portable Power System (REPPS), which is primarily used to charge most common military batteries. The core technology was developed and deployed by the Army in the REPPS package. We have been receiving very positive feedback from the field on this system. Currently, the Army has 100 deployed and we have ordered an additional 700 systems.
2. The GREENS (Ground Renewable Expeditionary Energy Systems) is a USMC-developed project that employs energy storage and larger rigid panel photovoltaics. The Army was not the primary developer of this system. U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) is currently using the system in Afghanistan.

U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM) tested and qualified GREENS for deployment to USASOC. The USASOC version of GREENS is a significantly larger, less portable system. The USASOC-adapted GREENS system called Sundial is the same system that is referenced in point 4 below. It is a very large and heavy system (29,000 pounds just for the solar panels and batteries and 41,000 pounds total). The Army will continue to test this system.

3. The Army developed technologies, such as LED lighting for tents, flexible photovoltaic shading systems called Power Shades, and tent insulation. These technologies were evaluated as part of the Net Zero Plus Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) at Fort Irwin. As part of the JCTD, USMC also demonstrated energy-saving shelter technologies and had the opportunity to review the performance of the Army technologies. Based on their assessment, the Marines decided to employ some of the Army technologies demonstrated in the JCTD.

The Army is also in the process of transitioning several of the technologies. Improved insulated shelter liners are being fielded by PM-Force Sustainment Systems. LED lighting is now included in a revised shelter lighting specification and several Power Shades have been sent to theatre for Army field evaluation.

4. The U.S. Special Operations Command solar project is a USASOC effort to test/demo a 10kW continuous photovoltaic system. This is a recent effort, with USASOC as the Program of Record and Communications-Electronics Research, Development, and Engineering Center (CERDEC) within Army RDECOM as their technical arm.

5. The Army is currently developing and deploying energy networking capabilities to improve energy efficiency and equipment utilization, and facilitate integration of renewable energy technologies. An example is a 1MW microgrid system currently being prepared for deployment from the evaluation site at Fort Irwin, CA to Afghanistan.
6. The Army has deployed or is deploying a range of technologies to advance operational unit capabilities and extend resilience while reducing costs. For example:
 - The 1-16 Infantry Battalion, who just deployed to Afghanistan, will receive advanced power and energy capabilities in May 2011. These include networked power, conformable batteries and portable/silent battery charging at the individual and squad level and include solar, methanol and propane fuel-cell options.
 - The Advanced Medium-sized Mobile Power Sources family of generators will replace 5kW-60kW tactical generators, providing up to 20% greater fuel efficiency and compatibility with advanced microgrids, at lower cost.
 - This fiscal year, a tactical fuel automation system is being deployed to Operation Enduring Freedom in order to track fuel to the individual consumer. This system will, for the first time, provide data to inform theatre-wide decisions.
 - The Army continues to evaluate advanced technologies for deployment through analysis and test beds (e.g. "Net Zero Plus" Joint Concept Technology Demonstration at Fort Irwin and Smart and Green Energy for base camps).
7. To drive sustained improvement over time and across the entire Army enterprise, we are advancing a range of new policy and research initiatives. The Army uses policy and doctrine to drive unity of effort. Significant advancements are being made, or have been made in both policy and doctrine which will assure operational energy as a key factor in all the Army does. Some key highlights include:
 - Army policy now requires the inclusion of the fully burdened cost of energy in total ownership cost analysis in all acquisition actions, as established by the Army Acquisition Executive.
 - Army policy for contingency bases, nearing finalization, will guide additional efficiencies and reductions to the energy boot print.
 - Developing energy-efficient design specifications and incentivizing operational energy performance efficiencies through contract specifications of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program.
 - Developing energy-networking capabilities to improve energy efficiency and equipment utilization and facilitate integration of renewables, such as the 1MW microgrid system currently being prepared for deployment from the evaluation site at Fort Irwin, CA to Afghanistan.
 - The Advanced Affordable Turbine Engine, a replacement for the UH-60 and AH-64, is estimated to improve net energy efficiency by 12%.



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

APR 15 2011

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:


Thank you for your March 28, 2011 letter concerning Army training for counterinsurgency operations as it relates to the circumstances surrounding the death of Private First Class Rudy Acosta. Please pass my heartfelt condolences to the Acosta family for their profound loss.

As you requested, the Army conducted a review of the current pre-deployment training requirements, which includes the preparation of Soldiers and units for counterinsurgency operations. All commanders are directed to train their units on tasks to maintain base camp defense / security, establish security, react to contact, conduct antiterrorism awareness training, maintain situational awareness and conduct pre-combat checks or inspections for each mission. The Army believes this skill set adequately prepares Soldiers to detect and protect against similar attacks.

Although Army training guidance does not specifically require units to consider contracted security forces as a potential threat, infiltration of friendly forces is recognized during training as one of the many threats in operational environments associated with counterinsurgency missions.

Thank you for your inquiry into this matter and for your continued support for our Soldiers and their Families.

Sincerely,


John M. McHugh

*Mr. Chairman,
Let me know if
you desire further
information
-J-*



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER
108 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0108

120614015

JUN 20 2012

The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Pursuant to Section 1216 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111-383), as amended by Section 1216 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81), and on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, I am submitting a report on activities carried out to support the reintegration of individuals into Afghan society, collectively referred to as the Afghanistan Reintegration Program (ARP).

The enclosed report consists of a chart depicting ARP activities during the year, including number of projects and funds used in each ARP category, as well as an executive summary prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Of the \$50 million authorized for ARP this fiscal year, the Department executed \$6.16 thousand as of March 31, 2012.

Thank you for your recognition of the importance of this effort to our mission in Afghanistan.

Sincerely,

Dr. Mary Sally Matiella, CPA

Enclosure

Preparation of this semi-annual report/study cost the Department of Defense a total of approximately \$11.3K in the 2012 Fiscal Year. Ref ID: D-C814220

AFGHANISTAN REINTEGRATION PROGRAM

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: In FY12, DoD's Afghanistan Reintegration Program (ARP) further enabled security gains by helping the Afghan Government bring insurgent fighters peacefully back into Afghan society. The ARP program helps to fill gaps in implementation of the Afghan-led Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP), which has taken on increasing leadership and capacity for managing Afghan-led reintegration efforts. The APRP Joint Secretariat continues to build the capacity of the Provincial peace councils and has made considerable progress in delivery of community recovery programs, reintegration outreach, involvement of women, and institutional capacity building. The Afghan Government is appreciative of ARP assistance in supporting outreach and mediation efforts, capacity building for sub-national APRP organizations, and other APRP activities.

Project Categories and FY 2012 Obligations and Disbursements as of March 31, 2012

<u>Project Category</u>	<u>Amount (\$) Obligated</u>	<u>Amount (\$) Disbursed</u>	<u>Number (#) of Projects</u>
Community Projects Supporting Reintegration	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Establishment of District and Community-Level Administrative Procedures and Offices	\$238,416.27	\$205,925.33	13
Reintegration of Individuals	\$138,191.08	\$138,191.08	5
Reintegration of Individuals in Detention Facilities	\$0.00	\$0.00	0
Reintegration Outreach and Shuras	\$81,245.61	\$81,986.52	18
Security Measures that Support Reintegration	\$359.85	\$359.85	1
Support for Reintegration Mediation	\$158,000.00	\$142,998.95	2
TOTAL	\$616,212.81	\$569,461.73	39



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER
100 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0100

120614041

JUN 20 2012

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Affairs
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Madam Chairman:

Pursuant to Section 1216 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111-383), as amended by Section 1216 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81), and on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, I am submitting a report on activities carried out to support the reintegration of individuals into Afghan society, collectively referred to as the Afghanistan Reintegration Program (ARP).

The enclosed report consists of a chart depicting ARP activities during the year, including number of projects and funds used in each ARP category, as well as an executive summary prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Of the \$50 million authorized for ARP this fiscal year, the Department executed \$616 thousand as of March 31, 2012.

Thank you for your recognition of the importance of this effort to our mission in Afghanistan.

Sincerely,

Dr. Mary Sally Matiella, CPA

Enclosure

Preparation of this semi-annual report/study cost the Department of Defense a total of approximately \$11.3K in the 2012 Fiscal Year. Ref ID: D-C814220



120614066p

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER
109 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0109

JUN 20 2012

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Pursuant to Section 1216 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111-383), as amended by Section 1216 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81), and on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, I am submitting a report on activities carried out to support the reintegration of individuals into Afghan society, collectively referred to as the Afghanistan Reintegration Program (ARP).

The enclosed report consists of a chart depicting ARP activities during the year, including number of projects and funds used in each ARP category, as well as an executive summary prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Of the \$50 million authorized for ARP this fiscal year, the Department executed \$316 thousand as of March 31, 2012.

Thank you for your recognition of the importance of this effort to our mission in Afghanistan.

Sincerely,

Dr. Mary Sally Matiella, CPA

Enclosure

Preparation of this semi-annual report/study cost the Department of Defense a total of approximately \$11.3K in the 2012 Fiscal Year. Ref ID: D-CR14220



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER
109 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0109

120614072

JUN 20 2012

The Honorable John F. Kerry
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Pursuant to Section 1216 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111-383), as amended by Section 1216 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Public Law 112-81), and on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, I am submitting a report on activities carried out to support the reintegration of individuals into Afghan society, collectively referred to as the Afghanistan Reintegration Program (ARP).

The enclosed report consists of a chart depicting ARP activities during the year, including number of projects and funds used in each ARP category, as well as an executive summary prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Of the \$50 million authorized for ARP this fiscal year, the Department executed \$616 thousand as of March 31, 2012.

Thank you for your recognition of the importance of this effort to our mission in Afghanistan.

Sincerely,

Dr. Mary Sally Matiella, CPA

Enclosure

Preparation of this semi-annual report/study cost the Department of Defense a total of approximately \$11.3K in the 2012 Fiscal Year. Ref ID: D-C814220



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
ACQUISITION LOGISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY
103 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310

120614237

JUN 21 2012

The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Pursuant to the Senate Report 112-77, page 178 of the Fiscal Year 2012
Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, enclosed is the requested report on
Standardized, Light-Weight Power Sources.

The enclosed report addresses your concerns regarding batteries used in portable
military electronic devices, with emphasis on AA and AAA batteries and potential multi-
battery packs. The report also addresses reducing the number and types of batteries
being carried by dismounted Soldiers, to include developing better nonrechargeable
batteries, and pursuing the development of alternative energy sources.

Thank you for your support of the United States Army and our Soldiers.

Sincerely,

Heidi Shyu
Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)

Enclosure

Fiscal Year 2012
Standardized, Light-Weight Power Sources
Congressional Report



Prepared
June 2012

Preparation of this report/study cost the Department of Defense a total of
approximately \$41,000 for the 2012 Fiscal Year

I. Summary

The Army continues to improve Soldier access to and use of power. The importance of doing so has increased with time because Soldier power has become central to effective ground operations. Reducing the proliferation of battery types that Soldiers must carry is an important objective in overcoming this challenge because such proliferation adds to costs, sustainment challenges, and Soldier loads. This applies specifically to man-portable Communications and Electronics (C-E) systems.

This report cites previous test results and describes the Army battery procurement process, testing and performance metrics, the Army's selection process for its preferred battery list. In a study of alkaline AA multi-cell battery packs, the Army determined that such configurations were unfavorable with respect to safety, specific energy and weight, operational capabilities (regardless of temperature), and life cycle costs (when utilizing non-rechargeable AA/AAA batteries).

The Army is pursuing a variety of ways to reduce the number and types of batteries that our Soldiers carry; however, ten years of conflict and the imperative to quickly provide increased capabilities to forces in the field has resulted in an increased number of system-unique batteries. Army policy guidance and the Army's battery design concurrence process seek to reduce the proliferation of C-E battery types. The future establishment of the Product Director for Soldier Power within Project Management Office Mobile electric Power (PMO MEP) will provide a single, authoritative point of coordination for the development and acquisition of batteries.

II. The Statement of Objective

Senate Report 112-77, accompanying the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2012 (Pub. L. 112-74) directed the Secretary of the Army to submit a report to the congressional defense committees on batteries for portable military electronic devices in the current and future Department of Defense inventory, with an emphasis on the AA, and AAA form factors, and their potential configuration into multi-cell battery packs. Performance metrics and testing should include safety, specific energy and weight, operational capability in high and low temperature extremes, resistance to leakage in extreme operating conditions involving shocks, drops and vibration, battery shelf life, their life cycle cost, maintenance, disposal, and U.S. production availability.

III. The Approach

This report provides information from several studies, including a U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command report, titled "Evaluation of Commercially Available AA Batteries" and a Government Accountability Office report, titled "Opportunities Exist to Improve DoD's Oversight of Power Source Investments" (GAO-11-113). Lastly, this report includes examples of specific Army efforts to reduce Soldier loads.

IV. Issues To Be Addressed

Multi-Cell Battery Packs

The Army has found that AA and AAA batteries are economical solutions to a number of operational power requirements and has conducted analyses to determine the efficacy of packaging multiple AA cells into battery packs. However, the Army has many C-E items that require large bursts of power or require sufficient power for long mission durations. Individual AA and AAA batteries have not been able to fulfill these higher end power requirements.

Previous studies resulted in the recommendation that users only consider using up to four (4) AA cells in multiple-cell battery packages. The Army has many applications for which the use of AA and AAA cells, both individually and in multiples up to 4 cells, are suitable sources of power. Packaging more than 4 AA cells into a battery, however, poses several operational impacts for Soldiers:

- Additional quantities of AA cells must be carried (added weight and volume - current infantry Soldiers already carry in excess of 40 AA cells for a 3-day mission);
- Soldiers must attempt to package several AA cells into battery packages that each have the same amount of remaining energy in order to preclude premature equipment failure;
- Identifying the correct cell orientation when installing multiple AA cells in low light conditions can cause improper installation of the cells, and subsequent equipment malfunction;
- Additional safety and control electronics must be added to the battery design, adding complexity to their use (requiring additional training) and increasing their cost.

Several years ago, the Army conducted a study to package AA alkaline cells into standard military battery configurations (the LiFeS2 version was not available). At the time, there was a desire to develop a BA-xx90 battery case that could be filled with AA cells by the user. Once the cells were depleted, additional cells could be acquired and replaced in the field. The results at that time indicated that the AA cell version of the battery was heavier, had significantly less operating time, and generated a substantial amount of heat when discharged (almost too hot to touch).

In summary, the Army has determined likely AA/AAA multi-cell battery packs to be unfavorable with respect to these significant issues: safety, specific energy and weight, operational capabilities (regardless of temperature), and life cycle costs (when utilizing non-rechargeable AA/AAA batteries).

Army Battery Policy

Army Regulation (AR) 70-1, *Acquisition Policy*, addresses the acquisition of batteries for C-E and other equipment. As expressed in AR 70-1, this policy encourages using:

- Commercial standard or military preferred batteries
- Rechargeable as opposed to throwaway batteries
- smaller numbers of batteries

AR 70-1 also states that the Army's objectives are to decrease the number and types of batteries, to increase the power and longevity of batteries, and to reduce the power needs of new systems and equipment. The Army will design equipment that uses military or commercial standard rechargeable/reusable batteries for training and garrison operations, where practicable, in future development, product improvement and production contracts for weapon and information systems using battery power.

Mandated in AR 70-1, paragraphs 8-10, the U.S. Army Communications-Electronics Command's Power Sources Center of Excellence (PSCOE) maintains the military preferred battery listing. In addition, Project Managers are encouraged to coordinate their system battery requirements with the PSCOE and are required to obtain approval from the Army Acquisition Executive—the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, ASA(ALT)—before batteries not recommended by the PSCOE are utilized.

In order to strengthen policy compliance, the Army is establishing the position of Product Director for Soldier Power within Project Manager – Mobile Electric Power (PM MEP) in order to facilitate central coordination, acquisition discipline and reduced battery proliferation. In the interim, PM MEP is coordinating with PM Soldier Warrior and other materiel developers to support an executable, long-range battery strategy.

Batteries on the "List of Preferred Batteries" are fielded in many systems throughout the Army, and are designated as acceptable for inclusion in new systems. Preferred batteries are non-proprietary in nature and the Army owns the specifications and rights to competitively procure these batteries from multiple vendors.

Army Preferred Battery List

The Army maintains a preferred list of batteries, of which twenty-two (including the AA and AAA configurations) are associated with C-E items. The PSCOE at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland maintains the list. The PSCOE is comprised of personnel from the respective power divisions of the Communications and Electronics Research Development and Engineering Center (CERDEC) and from the Communications and Electronics Command Life Cycle Management Center (CECOM LCMC). This organization is responsible for coordinating battery selection and development among the Research Development and Engineering Centers, maintaining a "preferred" battery list for Army materiel developers, assisting Defense Logistics

Agency with technical issues as they affect battery procurements, and for providing concurrences to any materiel developers or Program Managers (PM) who wish to incorporate a battery that is "non-preferred" into their systems. These concurrences are part of AR 70-1.

Even though there is a preferred batteries listing, several organizations in the Army manage batteries. Materiel Developers, or PMs, are responsible for the acquisition of systems that meet Soldier requirements within given cost and schedule constraints. These materiel developers are guided by user requirements and are regulated by various U.S. laws and regulations administered by the Department of Defense and Headquarters Department of the Army. Over the last ten years of conflict, PMs have strived to provide Soldiers the greatest operational capabilities in the shortest amount of time, while simultaneously trying to keep system cost affordable. This has contributed to the large number of non-preferred batteries being used today. The Army acknowledges this challenge and is developing options to address the problem.

Battery Procurement Process and Performance Metrics

The Army employs a multifaceted C-E system battery development process. The CERDEC, researches improvements in chemical properties, electronic capabilities, durability, and other qualities of batteries. In addition, the Army tracks battery improvements made in the commercial sector and incorporates those improvements into military batteries where possible. Over time, these efforts have resulted in longer-lasting, more powerful batteries in the field. The C-E suppliers and PMs who are responsible for these C-E systems choose the battery types that will meet all performance requirements of the system including battery life performance in environmental extremes and tactical conditions, life cycle cost, reliability, safety, etc.

The PM has the authority to make or propose trade-offs of various performance requirements that he or she deem in the best interest of the Soldier. AR 70-1, dated 22 July 2011, provides specific guidance to PMs regarding the selection of batteries. In this regulation, PMs are directed to field new systems, which use military or commercial standard rechargeable batteries, where practical. The regulation further states that, if military standard or commercial rechargeable batteries are not practical, then military "preferred" batteries should be the next choice. In some cases, the preferred batteries are chosen, but in others, a unique battery type is accepted. Once a battery is developed, tested, and approved for use, it is given a National Stock Number (NSN) and can be acquired as needed. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) has primary responsibility for the purchase of Army batteries. However, some batteries are acquired in other ways. For example, under certain circumstances an individual commander may purchase batteries.

All batteries must fully meet the performance requirements of the system in which they are used as part of the acquisition decision process before the system enters production and is fielded to Soldiers. These requirements must be demonstrated in tests which satisfy performance, safety, reliability and durability in the full range of system operational environments. These tests are conducted by and/or approved by

independent evaluators before approval to enter production is authorized by the Milestone Decision Authority.

Furthermore, military unique batteries approved by the PSCOE are procured using performance specifications which include qualification testing requirements to validate safety, electrical performance, and structural/mechanical integrity. Safety testing includes physical and electrical abuse testing, all of which are summarized in a Safety Assessment Report (SAR) that must be approved by the Army as part of the Safety Release process for each individual battery.

Figure 1 (below) illustrates the current process. Following the receipt of customer C-E needs, the system developer designs the system and battery pack; PSCOE reviews non-preferred battery requirements; and if PSCOE non-concurs with the PM's non-preferred battery design, the developer and project office redesign the system in order to accept a standard or preferred battery pack. [Note: If the developer and PM maintain a non-preferred battery design after PSCOE non-concurrence, the Army Acquisition Executive may decide not to proceed with further system development.]




Figure 1. Army Battery Procurement Process

Other Efforts to Lighten Soldier Load

The Army works with industry to improve the efficiency and performance of batteries. In military applications, batteries must be lightweight, efficient and durable, as well as have a high energy density for optimal performance and reliability at varying temperature ranges. These key parameters are applied to all battery chemistries. The Energizer LiFeS2 battery is an example of a commercial battery that is available for use. The Energizer LiFeS2 is used in applications such as GPS and flashlights. The Energizer AA battery is qualified for use, managed by DLA, and listed on the DLA site (NSN 6135-01-333-6101). However, increased performance comes at a cost. The cost of the Energizer LiFeS2 battery is generally eight to ten times the cost of alkaline AA batteries. The Energizer LiFeS2 battery is a non-rechargeable battery and is, therefore, further cost disadvantaged when compared to AA rechargeable alternatives.

An example of improvements in battery development is the BA-8180, which is a large (about the size of a small laptop) zinc-air battery that tethers to an end item instead of using an xx90 type of battery. One reason this battery is so efficient is that it uses oxygen from its surroundings to produce energy, thereby reducing the amount fuel that is required to be carried. Pound for pound, no other battery matches it in energy density which can equate to an overall decrease in the battery load carried by a Soldier.

The Army has also starting using a new model of the BA-5390/U known as the BA-5390A/U. This new model, shown below, has State of Charge LED Indicators. State of Charge Indicators (SOC) allow Soldiers to fully utilize battery capacity by displaying the remaining battery capacity in segments from 0% to 100%. This innovation also helps reduce battery load by providing the user an accurate measure of the charge remaining in the battery.




Figure 2: BA-5390A/U w/SOC

A final example of battery improvement is the BB-2590. This battery is made up of cells that are known by their size 18650 (pronounced "eighteen six-fifty"). In 2004, when BB-2590s were first produced, the 18650 cells provided 2.2 Ampere-hours (Ah) of capacity each. Today, without any weight or cost increase, the improved cells of BB-2590 batteries each have 2.6Ah of capacity. As a result, these improved cells have increased the total capacity of the BB-2590 battery from 6.2Ah to 7Ah.

The Army continues to explore new ways to improve current standard batteries as a way to reduce Soldier load. Three examples of this work are:

- **Ultralife - High Capacity BA-5390 Battery:** Non-rechargeable battery with 113% more power than current BA-5590 with the same volume
- **Ultralife - Small Format BA-5390 Battery:** Non-rechargeable battery with half the size and weight of current BA-5390
- **Ultralife - Lithium Ion Small Format UBI-2590:** Li-ion rechargeable 10 to 16 Volt battery with State of Charge half the size and weight of current BB-2590/BA-5590 Batteries, for use in various 12V system applications

Beyond improving batteries, the Army is exploring technologies that provide networked energy solutions to Soldiers in order to reduce the number of batteries needed for extended operations. The Soldier Worn Integrated Power Equipment System (SWIPES) consists of a Soldier-worn rechargeable conformal battery and distribution system to power Soldier devices from a conformal battery. For commonly used handheld communications, SWIPES utilizes Modular Lightweight Load-carrying Equipment (MOLLE) pouch-mounted chargers to maintain a high level of charge (80%) within an OEM battery. SWIPES also provides direct power to various GPS units and Shot Detection Systems. This more efficient centralized source will decrease battery weight by 33% on long duration missions (24-72 hrs).




Figure 3. Soldier Worn Integrated Power Equipment System

Another approach involves the use of renewable energy. The Rucksack Enhanced Portable Power System (REPPS) is a lightweight, portable power system capable of recharging batteries and/or acting as a continuous power source. It combines anti-glint solar panels and interchangeable connectors and adaptors for increased charging options. It can charge most common military battery types in five to six hours. If devices with higher power need to be charged, several REPPS may be "daisy-chained" together. The system provides the capability for simultaneous battery recharging while delivering power to an end item. This enables Soldiers to complete longer operations and extends the usage time for their equipment.




Figure 4. Rucksack Enhanced Portable Power System

V. Conclusion

The Army is continuously conducting research and reviewing commercial battery technologies in an effort to lessen Soldiers' loads and ensure their safety. This report cites a few examples of successful battery programs that have enhanced Army capabilities.

The Army has found that alkaline AA and AAA batteries are economical solutions to a number of power requirements. However, in many cases they are not good candidates for lessening Soldier load, because other battery chemistries provide superior energy per unit weight. Alkaline AA and AAA batteries are on the Army preferred battery list.

Regarding lithium iron-sulfide batteries, the Army has found that lithium iron disulfide AA and AAA batteries can be superior solutions to a number of power requirements. Lithium iron sulfide AA and AAA batteries are on the Army preferred battery list.

Previous Army studies on AA multiple-cell battery packs resulted in the recommendation that users only consider using up to 4 AA or AAA cells in multiple-cell battery packages for safety reasons. They indicated that alkaline AA multi-cell battery packs were heavier, had reduced operating time, and generated substantial heat when discharged.

The future establishment of the Product Director for Soldier Power within PM MEP will provide a single, authoritative point of coordination for the development and acquisition of batteries. In addition, the Army will continue to encourage commercial industry vendors to improve their battery technologies in pursuit of lessening Soldiers' loads and ensuring safety.

VI. References

- Army Battery Policy, July 2003
- Army Guidance on Selection/Approval of Portable/Mobile Power Sources, 4 October 2011
- Army Regulation 70-1, "Army Acquisition Policy," 22 July 2011
- "Evaluation of Commercially Available AA Batteries, Army Power Division," Command and Control Directorate, October 2011
- GAO-11-113, "Opportunities Exist to Improve DoD's Oversight of Power Source Investments," Government Accountability Office, December 2010
- "Improving the Battery Acquisition Process for Army Communications-Electronics Equipment: Report BA102T1," Michael E. Canes, Kevin C. Ennis, and Rachel C. Greenberg, Logistics Management Institute, February 2012
- "Metrics and Cost Effective Practices for a Condition-Based Maintenance System " DRR-4148-A, Thomas Held, Rand Corporation, January 2007



120614244

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
ACQUISITION LOGISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY
103 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310
JUL 2 1 2012

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Pursuant to the Senate Report 112-77, page 178 of the Fiscal Year 2012
Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, enclosed is the requested report on
Standardized, Light-Weight Power Sources.

The enclosed report addresses your concerns regarding batteries used in portable
military electronic devices, with emphasis on AA and AAA batteries and potential multi-
battery packs. The report also addresses reducing the number and types of batteries
being carried by dismounted Soldiers, to include developing better nonrechargeable
batteries, and pursuing the development of alternative energy sources.

Thank you for your support of the United States Army and our Soldiers.

Sincerely,

Heidi Shyu
Acting Assistant Secretary of the Army
(Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)

Enclosure



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

AUG 01 2012

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your July 12, 2012 letter concerning the University of Michigan's proposal for the Medical Countermeasures Advanced Development and Manufacturing (MCM ADM) Capability. I recognize the importance of the initiative to our defense against biological threats.

On June 25, 2012, the Michigan Advanced Development and Manufacturing Center (MADMC) filed a pre-award protest with the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Because this matter is pending GAO resolution, I am not able to address the specific concerns you have raised. The agency has 100 days in which to issue a ruling, and the Army is fully cooperating with GAO to ensure that a timely and informed decision is ultimately reached. No contract award can be made until the GAO has resolved the MADMC protest. Moreover, I can assure you that any award made as part of this program will be consistent with governing Federal Acquisition Regulations and best practices. The Army is committed to our ongoing shared efforts to protect our Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines from current and future biological threats.

Thank you for your inquiry into this matter and your continued support of our Army.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John M. McHugh", is written over a printed name. The signature is stylized with a large, sweeping "J" and "M".

John M. McHugh



120810396

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON
SEP 24 2012

The Honorable Darrell E. Issa
Chairman
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Please find enclosed the final set of materials related to your August 1, 2012, request for documents pertaining to the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) Forward Operational Assessment (FOA) report on the Palantir system. The Army is committed to providing our warfighters with the best available intelligence and analytical capabilities, and we appreciate this opportunity to provide the Committee with information regarding our extensive efforts in this area.

As you know, our Soldiers must rely on robust, up-to-date intelligence data to conduct extraordinarily dangerous missions around the world. The effective collection, aggregation and analysis of this information, which is obtained from sources ranging from human intelligence to space-based sensors, requires integrated tools that can analyze, connect and share the data across multiple combat environments.

No single system or piece of equipment is responsible for meeting the full range of intelligence needs for our warfighters. Units in combat depend on a diverse range of complementary systems that work together to provide useful information on a real-time basis.

The Distributed Common Ground System-Army (DCGS-A) assembles information from over 500 sources so analysts can detect patterns and offer actionable intelligence to our units. It is designed to provide commanders with improved situational awareness and the ability to rapidly shift focus to meet current and emerging battlefield threats. For example, the software allows leaders to conduct "link analysis" (the evaluation of disparate information to detect enemy relationships); geospatial processing/mapping of intelligence data; target development and nomination; weather and terrain analysis; and sensor/imagery processing, to include full motion video that we can share with our joint and coalition partners.

There is, however, no perfect intelligence system. As with any complex data analysis tool, DCGS-A must evolve to detect ever-changing enemy threats. Accordingly, we continuously make updates, refinements and improvements to our capabilities based upon user feedback and emerging technologies.

In this regard, we evaluate and, where appropriate, address urgent warfighter requests by fielding promising tools such as Palantir, which provides link analysis through an easy-to-use interface. In fact, the Army initially funded an operational assessment of Palantir by a deployed brigade in November 2009, and Army units currently use Palantir servers and licenses at multiple sites in Afghanistan. Palantir is one of several technologies that can provide short-term solutions to meet certain requirements in support of our forces.

It is important to note, however, that DCGS-A and Palantir are not interchangeable. Palantir is a "stand-alone," commercial product that we currently use to supplement, but not supplant, DCGS-A's capabilities. To fully meet commanders' operational needs, we must have more robust, interoperable tools that effectively share intelligence information, analysis and products across multiple systems. As a "stand-alone" product, Palantir imposes significant limitations in this regard.


Rest assured, the Army will fulfill requests for intelligence support in Afghanistan—and elsewhere—through an appropriate combination of developmental and commercial systems, as well as doctrine and training. We will also continue refining DCGS-A to fully address requirements in current and future combat environments. Of note, using the insights and recommendations of Soldiers, we are currently working with over 40 industry partners to improve DCGS-A's functions and performance, including efforts to develop a more intuitive and simplified graphic user interface. In addition, the Army is assessing Palantir's capabilities through a Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA) signed in May 2012. This CRADA will explore the potential integration of Palantir components to enable interoperability. My staff stands ready to brief you on any of these matters.

Finally, as I noted in my previous letter, we are in the process of completing an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the publication of the ATEC FOA report, and look forward to sharing the results with the Committee. I have also directed senior members of the Army staff to conduct a thorough review of unit requests for the capabilities provided by Palantir. The team is examining the process by which such requests are addressed, as well as the manner in which capabilities are acquired and fielded. These reviews are ongoing and will be used to analyze previous events and inform our next steps.

The enclosed documents contain sensitive information subject to the nondisclosure provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. § 552) and Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a). The Army provides these documents with a full reservation of rights and with the understanding and intent that such provision is not a waiver to assert any applicable privilege. These documents are provided to the Committee for its official use. Any unauthorized release could have an adverse impact on the acquisition process. The Army respectfully requests that these documents be shared only with those who have an official need for the information, that the documents not be disclosed to the public, that appropriate steps be taken to safeguard these documents, and that the documents be destroyed after use.

Thank you for your inquiry and your continued support of our Soldiers and their Families.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John M. McHugh". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large initial "J" and "M".

John M. McHugh

Enclosures

120910031



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

SEP 21 2012

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your August 31, 2012 letter concerning the hazing incident at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, involving Sergeant (b) (6). This reply contains information protected by the Privacy Act; as such, it is intended for Senate Committee on Armed Services use only.

It is Army policy that all Soldiers are treated with dignity and respect. Hazing has no place in the Army and is inconsistent with our values and standards of conduct. Leaders and Soldiers who engage in hazing, or who tolerate such behavior, will continue to be held responsible for their actions. The Army continues to place great emphasis in eradicating such behavior from our ranks.


Regarding this specific incident, a field grade officer from outside of the chain of command immediately conducted a commander's inquiry. Sergeant First Class (b) (6) the Company First Sergeant, was formally relieved of his position, punished under the provisions of Article 15, Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) and received a General Officer Memorandum of Reprimand from the Commanding General, Task Force All American.

Upon discovery of the incident, the Brigade Command Sergeant Major personally conducted professional development training for all non-commissioned officers in the brigade. The training focused on the Army Command Policy on hazing – specifically that such behavior is not tolerated in the Army.

Our effort to eradicate hazing is leader-driven and focuses attention, in particular, on graduation and advancement ceremonies, as well as other similar occasions, that put Soldiers at risk for voluntary or involuntary hazing. Army policy and applicable UCMJ articles are currently under review to ensure hazing guidelines are clear and the seriousness and consequences of such conduct is understood.

I trust this information is helpful to you. Thank you for your inquiry into this matter and your continued support of our Soldiers, Families and Veterans.

Sincerely,


John M. McHugh



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON
DEC 05 2012

121110304
FILE COPY

The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Chairman McKeon:


Thank you for your October 24, 2012 letter concerning the Magneto Inductive-Remote Activation Munition System (MI-RAMS).

Let me assure you that the Army did not terminate the MI-RAMS program. The Army temporarily discontinued the contract negotiations to procure the M40 Type B Receiver due to high unit cost concerns. After further analysis, the Army decided to complete the M40 Type B Receivers procurement by combining funding for FY12-13, which will allow the Army to meet the full requirement while at a more affordable unit cost. We expect to complete the procurement after the FY13 Defense Appropriations bill is enacted.

The M40 Type B Receiver is a new munition item and not yet in the inventory; consequently, it has no usage/expenditure history. Once the initial procurement quantity is fielded and usage rates are established, the M40 will compete for funding within the Army's budgeting process to replenish those items consumed in combat and/or training.

Thank you for your inquiry into this matter and your continued support of our Soldiers, Families, and Veterans.

Sincerely,



John M. McHugh

121110416



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

SEP 28 2012

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing in response to a request from Representative Bobby Schilling for award of the Medal of Honor for Captain (b) (6). After giving this request careful, personal consideration, I have determined that Captain (b) (6) did not meet the strict criteria for award of the Medal of Honor. However, I have approved award of the Silver Star, our Nation's third highest award for valor, in recognition of his gallantry.

Title 10, United States Code, Section 1130, Consideration of Proposals for Decorations Not Previously Submitted in a Timely Fashion: Procedures for Review, directs that, upon request of a Member of Congress, the Secretary of the Army shall review a proposal for the award or presentation of a decoration (or the upgrading of a decoration) that is not otherwise authorized to be presented or awarded due to time limitations established by law or policy. Based upon such a review, the Secretary of the Army shall make a determination as to the merits of approving the award or presentation of the decoration.

Based on this legislation, the Army recently reviewed the proposal for award of the Medal of Honor for Captain (b) (6). In accordance with our normal procedures, the Army Decorations Board reviewed the case and forwarded its recommendation to the Senior Army Decorations Board, who, in turn, considered the action and submitted it to me with its recommendation.

This brave Soldier clearly distinguished himself through his courageous actions. The Army and our Nation are forever grateful for his heroic service.

Similar letters have been sent to the Ranking Member of your committee, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Committee and Representative Schilling.

Thank you for your continued support of our Army.

Sincerely,

John M. McHugh

121110416



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

SEP 28 2012

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing in response to a request from Representative Bobby Schilling for award of the Medal of Honor for Captain (b) (6). After giving this request careful, personal consideration, I have determined that Captain (b) (6) did not meet the strict criteria for award of the Medal of Honor. However, I have approved award of the Silver Star, our Nation's third highest award for valor, in recognition of his gallantry.

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
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This brave Soldier clearly distinguished himself through his courageous actions. The Army and our Nation are forever grateful for his heroic service.

Similar letters have been sent to the Ranking Member of your committee, the Chairman and Ranking Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee and Representative Schilling.

Thank you for your continued support of our Army.

Sincerely,


John M. McHugh

121110418



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON
1600 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1600

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

April 19, 2013

The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington DC 20515

Dear Chairman McKeon:

Pursuant to your Committee request on March 27, 2012, enclosed is a copy of documents related to the case of United States v. Chief Warrant Officer Two (b) (6). Specifically, the enclosed 596 pages consist of: the Army Criminal Investigation Division report for this case, including a Honolulu Police Department report related to a rape allegation; the Article 32 investigation transcript; and the Convening Authority recommendation and approval of Mr. (b) (6) resignation in lieu of court-martial.

Portions of these unredacted documents are protected from disclosure under privacy and law enforcement exemptions to the Freedom of Information Act, as well as the Privacy Act. Therefore, these documents are provided for committee use only. The Army provides these documents with a full reservation of rights and with the understanding and intent that this provision is not a waiver to assert any applicable privilege. We respectfully request that these documents be shared within the Committee only to those who have an official need for the information, that the document not be disclosed to any members of the public, that appropriate steps are taken to safeguard the documents, and that the documents are destroyed after Committee use.

I trust that this information will be beneficial to your Committee. Thank you for your continued support of our Soldiers and the Army.

Sincerely,

William E. Rapp
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief, Legislative Liaison

Enclosure



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF LEGISLATIVE LIAISON
1600 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-1600

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

April 19, 2013

The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington DC 20515

Dear Chairman McKeon:

Pursuant to your Committee request on March 27, 2012, enclosed is a copy of documents related to the case of United States v. Chief Warrant Officer Two Jeremy Goulet. Specifically, the enclosed 596 pages consist of: the Army Criminal Investigation Division report for this case, including a Honolulu Police Department report related to a rape allegation; the Article 32 investigation transcript; and the Convening Authority recommendation and approval of Mr. Goulet's resignation in lieu of court-martial.

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I trust that this information will be beneficial to your Committee. Thank you for your continued support of our Soldiers and the Army.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "William E. Rapp", is positioned above the typed name.

William E. Rapp
Major General, U.S. Army
Chief, Legislative Liaison

Enclosure



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER
109 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0109

130436135

JUN 26 2012

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

On behalf of the Secretary of Defense, I am providing the status of Fiscal Year 2012 (FY12) appropriated funds expended in support of the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). The information provided reflects commitment, obligation, and disbursement data through May 31, 2012.

FY12 CERP Status as of May 31, 2012

Theater	Appropriated	Committed	Obligated	Disbursed
Afghanistan	\$400,000,000	\$72,807,690	\$42,555,776	\$25,538,558

The FY12 CERP execution data for Afghanistan is shown above. There is no CERP funding for Iraq in FY12. For your reference, I have enclosed updated data on CERP execution in prior fiscal years, beginning with the initial appropriation in FY04.

Sincerely,

Dr. Mary Sally Matrella, CPA

Enclosure

Preparation of the report/study for this month cost the Department of Defense a total of approximately \$805 for each month of 2012 Fiscal Year. RefID: F-C3AC7AB

**Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP)
FY 2004 - 2012 Appropriations, Obligations, and Disbursements**

As of May 31, 2012

(Numbers may not add exactly due to rounding.)

		Total		
		Total Appropriated	Obligations	Disbursements
FY 2004	¹	\$180,000,000	\$168,808,606	\$168,808,606
FY 2005	¹	\$854,000,000	\$797,836,174	\$797,836,174
FY 2006	^{1,2}	\$923,000,000	\$805,831,491	\$805,831,491
FY 2007		\$956,400,000	\$894,979,308	\$894,863,780
FY 2008	³	\$1,726,841,000	\$1,345,067,524	\$1,344,150,809
FY 2009	³	\$1,500,000,000	\$843,750,387	\$816,634,087
FY 2010	^{4,5}	\$1,150,000,000	\$588,629,839 *	\$573,087,573 *
FY 2011		\$500,000,000	\$451,676,680 *	\$358,605,218 *
FY 2012		\$400,000,000	\$42,555,776	\$25,538,558

		Afghanistan		
		Obligations	Disbursements	
FY 2004	¹	\$35,218,467	\$35,218,467	
FY 2005	¹	\$130,736,130	\$130,736,130	
FY 2006	¹	\$159,403,706	\$159,403,706	
FY 2007		\$178,408,292	\$178,408,292	
FY 2008		\$408,852,997	\$407,936,283	
FY 2009		\$514,150,593	\$487,034,293	
FY 2010	⁵	\$334,188,577 *	\$318,646,310 *	
FY 2011		\$407,692,259 *	\$314,620,797 *	
FY 2012		\$42,555,776	\$25,538,558	

		Iraq		
		Obligations	Disbursements	
FY 2004	¹	\$133,590,139	\$133,590,139	
FY 2005	¹	\$667,100,044	\$667,100,044	
FY 2006	¹	\$646,427,786	\$646,427,786	
FY 2007		\$716,571,015	\$713,455,487	
FY 2008		\$936,214,527	\$933,214,527	
FY 2009		\$329,599,794	\$323,599,794	
FY 2010		\$254,441,262 *	\$254,441,262 *	
FY 2011		\$43,984,420	\$43,984,420	
FY 2012		\$0.00	\$0.00	

¹ FY2004, FY2005, and single-year FY2006 appropriations are now closed.

² Includes \$198,000,000 in FY2006 multi-year authority that was obligated in FY2007 and FY2008.

³ Appropriated total; excess CERP authority was realigned to other OMA requirements in the year of execution.

⁴ Appropriated total was originally \$1,200,000,000; above amount of \$1,150,000,000 reflects \$50,000,000 transferred to Department of State in support of Afghanistan National Solidarity Program, as authorized by 2010 NDAA language; excess CERP authority was allowed to expire.

⁵ FY10 Afghanistan totals include \$385,479.55 in obligations and \$385,174.31 in disbursements for the Afghanistan Reintegration Program.

* Includes some projects executed by the Task Force - Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO).



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND COMPTROLLER
109 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON DC 20310-0109

JUN 26 2012

The Honorable Carl Levin
 Chairman
 Committee on Armed Services
 United States Senate
 Washington, DC 20510-6050

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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Sincerely,

Dr. Mary Sally Mattiella, CPA

Enclosure



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
101 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0101

03 AUG 2012

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This letter is submitted to satisfy the House Report 112-78 requirement that accompanied the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Pub. L. 112-81), which directed the Secretary of the Army to deliver a report regarding "the recent Army decision to disestablish the Research Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM)."

While the final report of the 2010 Army Acquisition Review recommended disestablishment of RDECOM and return of the Research, Development and Engineering Centers (RDECs) to the Lifecycle Management Command (LCMC) Commanders, the Army did not concur with this recommendation. We have, therefore, not made any decision to disestablish the RDECOM.

We agree that Science and Technology (S&T) investments are important for the Army's future, and have long employed a Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army to provide senior level guidance in S&T.

You should also be aware that the Secretary of the Army directed the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) (ASA(ALT)) and the Commander, U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) to develop a plan to optimize the Army's materiel enterprise. These efforts are ongoing and will be balanced with the approved recommendations of the 2010 Acquisition Review.

I trust this information is helpful and I thank you for your continued support of our Soldiers and their Families.

Sincerely,

Thomas E. Hawley

Preparation of this report/study cost the Department of Defense a total of approximately \$140 for the 2012 Fiscal Year.



1304136241

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
101 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0101

03 AUG 2012

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This letter is submitted to satisfy the House Report 112-78 requirement that accompanied the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Pub. L. 112-81), which directed the Secretary of the Army to deliver a report regarding "the recent Army decision to disestablish the Research Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM)."

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Sincerely,

Thomas E. Hawley

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
101 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0101

03 AUG 2012

The Honorable Harold Rogers
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This letter is submitted to satisfy the House Report 112-78 requirement that accompanied the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Pub. L. 112-81), which directed the Secretary of the Army to deliver a report regarding "the recent Army decision to disestablish the Research Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM)."

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Sincerely,

Thomas E. Hawley

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Department of Defense a total of approximately
\$140 for the 2012 Fiscal Year.



130436246

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
101 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-0101

The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

(3 AUG 2012

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This letter is submitted to satisfy the House Report 112-78 requirement that accompanied the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Pub. L. 112-81), which directed the Secretary of the Army to deliver a report regarding "the recent Army decision to disestablish the Research Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM)."


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Sincerely,



Thomas E. Hawley

Preparation of this report/study cost the
Department of Defense a total of approximately
\$140 for the 2012 Fiscal Year.



80114782
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

FEB 12 2008

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your January 29, 2008 letter concerning an allegation that the command at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, improperly endorsed a religious program known as Free Day Away for Initial Entry Training (IET) Soldiers. Your letter also referenced concerns raised by Mr. (b) (6) about the treatment of atheist Soldiers in the Army and, more specifically, that atheist Soldiers in Iraq were being subjected to abusive treatment by Christian fundamentalist Soldiers.

Mr. (b) (6) previously filed a complaint with the Fort Leonard Wood Inspector General (IG) on August 15, 2006, raising his concerns about the Free Day Away program. The Fort Leonard Wood IG found that the program does not violate Army policy in that participation is voluntary and the command informs the Soldiers that religious services will be presented as part of the program. Additionally, the Office of the Chief of Chaplains reviewed the Army Chaplaincy policies as they apply to the Free Day Away program and found no deviation from Army policy or law. The Fort Leonard Wood IG determined that IET Soldiers have opportunities to participate in non-religious morale, welfare, and recreation programs, but that these activities vary from unit to unit. More specifically, during the Free Day Away program IET Soldiers can remain in the barracks or go to an on-post facility, such as a Post Exchange Annex.

The additional allegations raised by Mr. (b) (6) that atheist Soldiers were abused and treated unfairly by Christian Soldiers while deployed to Iraq remain under investigation by the Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG). They have interviewed Mr. (b) (6) and are interviewing additional witnesses. We will provide the results to your office separately when we complete our investigation.

My research in response to your letter has persuaded me of the need to review both the religious and secular programs offered our Soldiers while they are in IET, to insure that the programs are offered, provided, and conducted in a manner that respects and protects the religious freedom of all Soldiers. I have directed the DAIG to conduct a comprehensive review of such programs across all Army Training Centers. We will provide the results to your office when we complete the review.

Thank you for your support of our Soldiers and their Families.

Sincerely,

Pete Geren

80114788



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

MAR 25 2008

The Honorable Carl M. Levin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This is a follow-up to my response of February 11, 2008, to your letter of January 28, 2008 letter concerning declassification of an Army memorandum from the Army's Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans to the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, J-5, The Joint Staff. As I noted in my February 11, 2008 letter, we were unable to locate a signed copy of the memorandum in question. However, we did locate a working draft of the memorandum, which has now been declassified. A copy is enclosed for your use.

If I can be of further assistance in this matter, please let me know.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Pete Geren".

Pete Geren

Enclosure

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HEADQUARTER, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans
(Joint Affairs)

ARMY PLANNER DAMO-ZC
Memorandum No.

MEMORANDUM FOR LEGAL COUNSEL TO CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF

SUBJECT: ~~(S/NF)~~ SJS 02-06697

1. ~~(S/NF)~~ Army has reviewed the request of the Commander, United States Southern Command, for further legal review by the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice of the proposal to employ Counter-Resistance Techniques in the intelligence interrogation of enemy combatants detained at Guantanamo Bay Naval Station.
2. ~~(S/NF)~~ As set forth in the enclosed memoranda, Army interposes significant legal, policy and practical concerns regarding most of the Category II and all of the Category III techniques proposed.
3. ~~(S/NF)~~ Army concurs in the recommendation for a comprehensive legal review of this proposal in its entirety by the Department of Defense and the Department of Justice.

Encls

1. CITF Legal Opinion
2. OTJAG e-mail

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*REMARKED UNCLASSIFIED 20 Feb 08
Source Documents DECLASSIFIED
39 08 2004*



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

CITF

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION TASK FORCE
6010 6th Street
FORT BELVOIR, VA 22060-3506

4 November 2002

MEMORANDUM THRU

Division Chief, Plans, Policy and Integration, DoD CITF, Bldg. 714, Fort Belvoir,
Virginia 22060-5506

FOR COMMANDER, CITF

SUBJECT: Assessment of JTF-170 Counter-Resistance Strategies and the Potential
Impact on CITF Mission and Personnel

1. Pursuant to your directive I have reviewed the following documents in order to
provide an assessment of potential impacts on the CITF mission:

• DOD JTF 170 Memorandum from LTC (b) (6) dated 11 October 2002,
SUBJECT: Legal Review of Aggressive Interrogation Techniques, with attached Legal
Brief of the same date.

• DOD JTF 170 Memorandum from LTC (b) (6) dated 11 October 2002,
SUBJECT: Request for Approval of Counter-Resistance Strategies

DOD JTF 170 Memorandum from MG Michael E. Dunlavey dated 11 October 2002,
SUBJECT: Counter-Resistance Strategies

• USSOCOM Memorandum from General James T. Hill, dated 25 October 2002,
SUBJECT: Counter-Resistance Techniques

2. The following represents my assessment of the adverse impacts on the CITF mission
if certain counter-resistant techniques are used at GTMO:

a. Liability. CITF personnel who are aware of the use or abuse of certain
techniques may be exposed to liability under the UCMJ for failing to intercede or report
incidents, if an inquiry later determines the conduct to be in violation of either the Eighth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the Uniform Code of Military Justice or
18 U.S.C. §2340.

(1) The legal memorandum cited above opines that certain treatment,
although not amounting to torture, has been determined to constitute cruel and unusual,
or inhumane treatment or punishment insofar as it is defined in the Convention Against
Torture ("CAT"). Although the United States has not ratified the entire CAT, it has

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BY OSD 2004*

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ratified the definition of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment insofar as the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution defines it. Therefore, any conduct that would constitute cruel and unusual punishment would be prohibited by the Constitution and would be illegal.

(2) The suggested Tier III and certain Tier II techniques may subject service members to punitive articles of the UCMJ. The following are the most likely provisions to be violated if service members participated in the described techniques: Article 93 (Cruelty and Maltreatment), Article 124 (Maiming), Article 128 (assault) and Article 134 (Communicating a Threat). Should the detainee die in the process or as a result of the techniques, then Article 118 (Murder) and Article 134 (Negligent Homicide) could apply. CITEF members who are aware of or participate in the conduct could be held responsible under the inchoate offenses of Article 80 (Attempt), Article 81 (Conspiracy) or Article 82 (Accessory After the Fact).

*prob.
value
to
reasonable
person*

b. Evidentiary Issues. Under Military Commission Order Number 1, if the Presiding Officer determines that the information is probative to a reasonable person, then it will be admitted. This would apply to confessions as well as statements about other defendants. The voluntary nature of any statement, however, will affect the weight accorded that evidence. Consequently, any information derived from the aggressive techniques, although admissible, will be of diminished value during any subsequent proceedings. The taint concerning the diminished weight accorded the statements would apply not only to the detainee making the statements, but also against those individuals about whom the detainee has provided incriminating information.

Additionally, the adverse impact may have consequences on all Commission actions. The al Qaeda training manual instructs members to assert that they have been tortured. The assertion is designed to mitigate the value of any incriminating statements the al Qaeda member may have made during the course of the interrogation. One detainee subjected to these techniques could taint the voluntary nature of all other confessions and information derived from detainees not subjected to the aggressive techniques.

3. Recommendations: Both the utility and legality of applying certain techniques identified in the memorandum listed above are, in my opinion, questionable. Any policy decision to use the Tier III techniques, or any technique inconsistent with the analysis herein, will be contrary to my recommendation. Nonetheless, if the application of the requested measures is approved, I recommend the following actions to mitigate the adverse impact on the CITEF:

a. The aggressive techniques should not occur at GTMO where both CITEF and the intelligence community are conducting interviews and interrogations. By not using these techniques in a co-located setting, other detainees not subjected to these techniques are less likely to be under the impression that they will be subjected to similar treatment if they do not provide the answers the government is seeking. It is unlikely that a detainee who has been exposed to Tier III techniques will distinguish between CITEF and

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Intelligence Interrogators. His impression will be that he will be punished for any responses that differ from what the interrogator determines to be acceptable.

b. A decision should be made prior to applying the aggressive procedures that the detainee subject to the treatment would not be considered for referral to the Military Commission. This will reduce the risk that the more aggressive techniques used against a few detainees would be revealed resulting in assumption that these techniques had been used on all the detainees.

c. CTF personnel should not participate in the aggressive techniques, either in their administration, observation or designation of who will be subjected to the strategies. A firm nonporous wall should be erected between CTF personnel and those planning and engaging in the aggressive techniques. This measure will help preserve the integrity of our investigations, any Commission case and will insulate CTF personnel from potential administrative or criminal liability.

4. Conclusion. While some of the techniques identified in Tier I and II pose no threat to either the integrity of the investigation or to subsequent liability of the CTF personnel, i.e. using a ruse, raising one's voice, for the most part they are inconsistent with well-established law enforcement techniques. Any of the Tier III techniques could expose persons involved to administrative and criminal liability as well as negatively impact on subsequent Military Commission proceedings.

In legal analysis conducted by the SJA for JTF-170, there are two common themes running throughout the document justifying the use of the procedures, 1) There is no civil liability that will flow to the U.S. Government by using the asserted techniques, and 2) because the purpose of inflicting pain and treating detainees in a degrading manner is not in and of itself to cause pain or harm but to elicit information, it does not conflict with the well established authority under the U.S. Constitution.

There is no Constitutional case law related to the infliction of pain on prisoners, other than that related to causing pain for pain's sake, because it is not the prison official's objective to elicit information from those in their custody. Conversely, our objective is specifically to elicit information from the detainees. The intended use of Tier III techniques, if detected, will establish new case law in this area, much to the detriment of the U.S. foreign and domestic interests. I cannot advocate any action, interrogation, or otherwise, that is predicated upon the principal that all is well if the ends justify the means and others are not aware of how we conduct our business.

4 Encls

(b) (6)

MAJ, JA
Chief Legal Advisor

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DAJA-10

MEMORANDUM FOR THE OFFICE OF THE ARMY GENERAL COUNSEL

SUBJECT: Review -- Proposed Counter-Resistance Techniques

1. I have reviewed the proposed request for approval of counter resistance strategies. I concur in the proposed Category I techniques, but have significant concerns (legal, policy, and practical) regarding most of the Category II and all of the Category III techniques.

2. My legal concerns are summarized as follows:

a. The President directed in Military Order 1 (13 Nov 01) that detainees would be treated "humanely." In a White House Memo, dated 7 Feb 02, he reaffirmed this order and stated further that they will be treated "to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the principles of Geneva."

b. In addition to comporting with the President's order, any techniques employed must be consistent with Federal law, to include the UCMJ. As noted in LTC Beaver's legal review, the U.S. has enacted a Federal torture statute (18 U.S.C. 2340, et seq). This statute defines torture as an act "intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering ... upon another person within his custody or physical control." Severe physical pain or suffering is further defined as "the prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from ... the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe physical pain or suffering; ... threat of imminent death; or the threat that another person will imminently be subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering."

c. In my opinion, the listed Category III techniques violate the President's order, and various UCMJ articles. In addition, techniques 1 (use of scenarios designed to convince the detainee of death or severely painful consequences are imminent for him and/or his family), and 3 (use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the misperception of suffocation) appear to be clear violations of the Federal torture statute.

d. Regarding the Category II techniques, numbers 2 (prolonged use of stress positions), 5 (deprivation of light and auditory stimuli), and 12 (using individual phobias to induce stress), in my opinion, crosses the line of "humane" treatment, would likely be considered maltreatment under Article 93 of the UCMJ and may violate the Federal torture statute if it results in severe physical pain or suffering. Techniques 10 (removal of clothing) and 11 (forced grooming) are certainly permissible for health reasons, but are problematic (may be considered inhumane) if done only for interrogation purposes. To properly assess these and the other techniques listed Category II, we would need a more detailed plan of exactly how these techniques are going to be used.

3. From a policy standpoint, employing many of the suggested techniques would create a PR nightmare. The War on Terror is expected to last many years and ultimate success requires strong domestic and international support. Whatever interrogation techniques we adopt will eventually become public knowledge. If we mistreat detainees, we will quickly lose the morale high ground and public support will erode. The techniques noted above will not read well in either the New York Times or the Cairo Times. Additionally, many of the techniques arguably violate the torture and inhumane treatment provisions of the ICC. While we may not be subject to the ICC, failure to adhere to these provisions severely undercuts our stated position that we follow international law and principles and will police our own.

4. Finally, the plan does not adequately lay out how these techniques will result in our forces gaining any useful information.

5. In view of the foregoing, I believe the proposed plan is legally insufficient, and that a more thorough legal, policy and practical analysis should be conducted before any of the Category II and III techniques are adopted.

(b) (6)

80210604



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON DC 20310

FEB 11 2008

The Honorable Carl M. Levin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your February 4, 2008, letter concerning the results and supporting data from the 5.56mm Carbine Extreme Dust Test. Enclosed per the Committee's request, is a copy of the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) test report with supporting documentation.

These documents contain information that is exempt from public disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, Exemptions 4 and 5 (trade secrets/commercial information and predecisional materials). The documents must be appropriately safeguarded and may not be released to any third party.

The U.S. Army provides these documents with a full reservation of rights and with the understanding and intent that such provision shall not be deemed a waiver to assert any applicable privilege. The U.S. Army respectfully requests that these documents be shared only with those who have an official need for the information, that the documents not be disclosed to the public, that appropriate steps are taken to safeguard these documents, and that the documents are destroyed after use. If the Committee wishes to disclose these documents to the public, prior coordination with the U.S. Army records custodian (ATEC) is requested so that the U.S. Army can review and provide publicly releasable versions of the documents.

The U.S. Army System Assessment Report is programmed for completion later this month. The report will include the U.S. Army's analysis of the scored data, and summarize the results of the test. We will provide the System Assessment Report to the Committee as soon as the report is complete.

Thank you for your continuing interest in the U.S. Army and our Soldiers.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Pete Geren", is written over a horizontal line.

Pete Geren

Enclosure



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

FEB 22 2008

80211838

The Honorable Ike Skelton
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your February 11, 2008 letter regarding a *New York Times* article entitled, "Army Buries Study Faulting Iraq Planning." The article cites an independent assessment being prepared for the Army by the RAND Arroyo Center on prewar planning and occupation of Iraq. You requested that we "release the full, classified version of the report to the appropriate committees in Congress, and allow the publication of the unclassified summary of the report." We will do so.

I appreciate the opportunity more fully explain the genesis of this important project and its current status. As Mr. (b)(6) of the Army Staff briefed your staff on February 15, 2008, this multiyear effort is nearing completion. The findings will be published in eight separate reports totaling over 3,000 pages. Six of the eight reports will be classified, including a classified executive summary that has not yet been written.

When these reports are completed, we will provide copies to Congressional defense committees.

In response to your request, attached is an excerpt of one report that highlights planning and occupation challenges encountered by coalition governments and forces, and our resulting successes and failures.

Sincerely,

Pete Geren

Attachment

Assessing Postwar Efforts

The United States did not plan well for the complexities and violence of post-Saddam Iraq. Although many U.S. government agencies invested a lot of time and effort in identifying possible reconstruction requirements for postwar Iraq, the basic plan for war largely pushed these requirements aside. Indeed, in overlooking the need to enforce security in the immediate aftermath of Saddam's fall, the warplan may well have contributed to the problems U.S. forces now face.

How did this happen? More important, what can the U.S. Army do to avoid the flaws of the OIF warplan in the future? After all, Iraq and Afghanistan may not be the only state-sized battlegrounds of the war on terrorism. Insofar as terrorists find safe haven in states like Afghanistan, or exploit the weaknesses of failing states generally, regime change, state-building, reconstruction, governance—the missions U.S. forces have taken on in Iraq—are likely to recur in future military operations. Although these missions call on the forces of all services as well as those of other states, they fall mainly to ground forces, for the obvious reason that only ground forces can seize, hold, and control territory and people.

The planning challenge to the Army is critical but especially vexing. As they do in Iraq today, Army forces play a major role in post-conflict operations. Yet they are only part of a much larger planning process that includes large sections of the government and is driven, rightly, by the nation's and the Defense Department's civilian leadership. The Army can shape doctrine and forces to better take on counter-insurgency and stability operations, but the larger issue raised in this report is how it can help to better shape a planning process much larger than itself.

Shaping the Plan

If myriad voices within and outside the U.S. government sought to call attention to the possible challenges of post-Saddam Iraq, why did the planning process fail to account for these possibilities? The story begins at a fairly high level, where key assumptions about post-Saddam Iraq remained largely unchallenged. But even at this high level, military voices could have sounded a louder warning than they did. In

fact, the plan was shaped by a rough convergence of civilian assumptions about post-Saddam Iraq and military views about responsibility for handling that part of the operation that together downplayed post-Saddam challenges and the role military forces should play in meeting them.

Unchallenged Assumptions and Expectations

U.S. government planning was driven by a particular view, held by senior policymakers in key positions in the government, of what would emerge as a result of combat operations and what would be required thereafter. While alternative views and outcomes were examined by the various organizations described in previous chapters, none of them formed a consistent basis for planning throughout the U.S. government. The high-level civilian view that prevailed was based on the following assumptions:

- The military campaign would have a decisive end and would produce a stable security environment. As discussed in Chapter Two, the civilian leadership believed that military operations would end once Saddam Hussein was removed from power, giving rise to a largely stable situation during the reconstruction phase. Local forces, particularly the police and the regular army, would be capable of providing law and order, so U.S. and coalition military forces could be withdrawn rapidly from Iraq. Administration officials had hoped to shrink the U.S. military presence to two divisions—between 30,000 and 40,000 troops—by the fall of 2003.¹ Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz succinctly expressed this assumption in his testimony to Congress on February 27, 2003, when he stated “it’s hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and to secure the surrender of Saddam’s security forces and his army.”²
- U.S. and coalition forces would be greeted as liberators. After Saddam was removed from power, the Iraqi population was expected to support the U.S. presence. Three days before the war, Vice President Cheney clearly articulated this view by stating “my belief is we will, in fact, be greeted as liberators.”³ Iraqi

¹ Interview with V Corps official, January 2005. These plans called for a third division, from a yet-to-be-determined coalition country, to join the two U.S. divisions in Iraq. Michael R. Gordon with Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Plans to Reduce Forces in Iraq, with Help of Allies,” *New York Times*, May 3, 2003; Esther Schrader and Paul Richter, “U.S. Delays Pullout in Iraq,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 15, 2003.

² Paul Wolfowitz, testimony to the House Budget Committee, February 27, 2003. It is worth noting that this assumption stood in stark contrast to the force estimates developed by the military. General Franks believed that the number of troops would have to be increased to 250,000 before being reduced, and General Shinseki, Task Force IV, and the Army staff estimated that the reconstruction phase would involve multiple hundreds of thousands of troops. See Chapters Two and Four.

³ Vice President Richard Cheney, remarks made on *Meet the Press*, televised March 16, 2003.

exiles emphasized that the Iraqis would greet U.S. forces with "sweets and flowers,"⁴ and CENTCOM commander General Franks worked from the assumption that the Iraqis would support U.S. forces, and perhaps even join them in combat, once they believed that the United States was serious about removing Saddam from power.⁵ It may be that U.S. officials insisted on the vision of the United States as a liberator as a way to avoid the responsibilities of occupying powers under the Geneva Conventions.⁶ Yet regardless of whether this view was ideological or instrumental, it was one of the reasons why U.S. forces, on the ground after the fall of Baghdad did not take steps to restore

- **Government ministries would continue to function.** Because the Ba'ath regime maintained a tightly centralized grip on power throughout the country, U.S. officials assumed that government ministries were largely effective state structures. As discussed in Chapter Five, they assumed that the top leadership of each ministry could be replaced, leaving the remaining technocrats and civil servants to continue running the state.
- **Humanitarian relief requirements would be extensive.** Humanitarian relief was the one area where U.S. officials assumed Phase III and Phase IV might overlap. They prepared for the possibility that more than a million people would flee their homes to avoid the effects of combat, and they worried that those numbers might be even higher if Saddam Hussein used weapons of mass destruction during the military campaign. They also assumed that hunger would be widespread, due to disruptions in the food distribution system, and that Iraq might experience significant sanitation problems as well.
- **Infrastructure throughout the country would remain largely intact.** The military campaign was designed to damage as little of Iraq's infrastructure as possible, focusing instead on regime centers of power. U.S. officials were concerned

⁴ Kanan Makiya, one of the Iraqi participants in the Future of Iraq project, acknowledged after the war that this had been his message to President Bush, and he stated "I admit I was wrong." Joel Brinkley and Eric Schmitt, "Iraqi Leaders Say U.S. Was Warned of Disorder After Hussein, but Little Was Done," *New York Times*, November 30, 2003. See also Woodward, p. 259.

⁵ Woodward, p. 81.

⁶ Sandra Mitchell, vice president of the International Rescue Committee, recounted that she and other NGO representatives discussed the responsibilities of occupying powers under the Fourth Geneva Convention with representatives of the U.S. Agency for International Development. She noted, "we were corrected when we raised this point. The American troops would be 'liberators' rather than 'occupiers,' so that the obligations did not apply." Quote from Fallows, p. 63.

⁷ As the 3rd Infantry Division noted in its after action report, "Because of the refusal to acknowledge occupier status, commanders did not initially take measures available to occupying powers, such as imposing curfews, directing civilians to work and controlling the local governments and populace. The failure to act after we displaced the regime created a power vacuum, which others immediately tried to fill." Quote from John J. Lumpkin and Dafna Linzer, "Army Says Policy Choice Led to Chaos in Iraq," *Philadelphia Inquirer*, November 28, 2003.

that Saddam might torch the oil fields during the war, so they took special precautions to prevent that. Generally speaking, however, they expected the oil sector, the power grid, and other key aspects of Iraq's infrastructure to remain mostly unaffected by the war, with only minimal reconstruction required afterward.

Actual postwar events proved most of these assumptions to be faulty. Phase III combat operations did not end neatly, and the United States was not greeted as a liberator.⁸ An insurgency started developing almost immediately, suggesting that General Shinseki's estimate that postwar operations would require "something on the order of several hundred thousand soldiers"⁹ may have been closer to the mark than the administration's optimistic assumption had been. Humanitarian relief requirements were minimal, which meant that the one contingency for which detailed plans had been developed never arose. Although the military campaign left most of Iraq's infrastructure intact, extensive looting in the aftermath of the conflict severely damaged infrastructure throughout the country. Moreover, U.S. analysts had underestimated the level of debilitation to Iraq's infrastructure after more than a decade of sanctions.¹⁰ Government ministries turned out to be hollow, without the capabilities and resources necessary to run the country once the Ba'athists were removed from power. Wolfowitz later acknowledged that defense officials had erred by making assumptions that "turned out to underestimate the problem" in postwar Iraq.¹¹ Iraq's reconstruction became the major undertaking described in Chapters Eight through Twelve.

Although the prevailing assumptions proved to be wrong, they were not unreasonable—or at least they were no less reasonable than a variety of other, less optimistic sets of assumptions. The problem was that the prevailing assumptions were never seriously challenged. Despite a predilection for questioning virtually all operational military assumptions from several directions,¹² and despite the existence of

⁸ Ten days after the war started, an unnamed senior administration official was already quoted in the press as questioning this assumption: "We underestimated their capacity to put up resistance. We underestimated the role of nationalism. And we overestimated the appeal of liberation." Bob Drogin and Greg Miller, "Plan's Defect: No Defectors," *Los Angeles Times*, March 28, 2003.

⁹ General Eric Shinseki, testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 25, 2003.

¹⁰ For more on the failure to correctly assess the status of Iraq's infrastructure, see Rajiv Chandrasekaran, "Crossed Wires Kept Power Off in Iraq," *Washington Post*, September 25, 2003.

¹¹ Wolfowitz identified three conditions that were worse than defense officials had anticipated: the failure of Iraqi army units to fight alongside the United States and assist in the reconstruction; the requirement to rebuild the police forces; and the difficulty of imagining that Ba'ath Party remnants would continue to fight. See U.S. Department of Defense News Transcript, "Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Briefing on His Recent Trip to Iraq," July 23, 2003. As of October 2007: <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2872>

¹² See Woodward and Franks for more detailed discussions.

alternative analyses within the government, those charged with planning for Iraq assumed that one particular scenario would play out and did not plan for other possible contingencies that had been identified both inside and outside the U.S. government.¹³

What explains the failure to challenge assumptions and develop alternate scenarios? One factor was the context in which the decision to go to war was being debated. Proponents of the intervention, within the administration and without, tended to argue that post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction would be manageable in terms of cost, time, and effort, while opponents argued the contrary. Once the basic decision to intervene had been made, reservations about the scale of effort needed for stabilization and reconstruction may have been interpreted as a form of bureaucratic obstruction—as obstacles to be overcome rather than valid concerns to be addressed.

Meanwhile, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Congress and the country as a whole were disinclined to challenge the administration on national security judgments. As a result, the decision to intervene received less congressional and media scrutiny than might have been the case under other circumstances. The administration's early and rapid success in installing a successor to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan only weeks after the initial entry of U.S. troops also engendered optimism that a similarly quick transition might be made in Iraq.

Ineffective Interagency Coordination

The dominance of a single set of assumptions about postwar Iraq suggests the absence of a robust interagency coordination process. Several U.S. government organizations, particularly the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the State Department, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the National Security Council (NSC), and the military commands conducted separate studies of postwar possibilities. Looking back, some of these studies appear to have been reasonably prescient. The problem, therefore, was not that the U.S. government failed to plan for the postwar period. Instead, it was the failure to effectively coordinate and integrate these various planning efforts.

Those functions normally fall to the National Security Council staff, which has overall responsibility for coordinating U.S. foreign and defense policies. In fact, as outlined in previous chapters, the NSC staff oversaw several interagency working groups that brought together representatives from DoD, State, CIA, and other orga-

¹³ The Defence Committee of the British House of Commons reached the same conclusion after an extensive inquiry into postwar planning and operations. After stating that a "wide range of predictions for the post-conflict situation in Iraq were made in advance of the conflict," the committee notes that "there is some evidence that the extensive planning, which we know took place in both the U.S. and the U.K., did not fully reflect the extent of that range." See United Kingdom House of Commons Defence Committee, *Iraq: An Initial Assessment of Post-Conflict Operations, Volume I*, Sixth Report of Session 2004–05, March 16, 2005, p. 3.

nizations. Most of these working groups focused on the conduct of the war, but the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction (IR+R) Working Group did focus on postwar plans. This group produced fairly detailed humanitarian relief plans, while its reconstruction plans remained vague—reflecting the assumptions described earlier in this chapter. These assumptions appear to have dominated the NSC staff's approach to planning as well.

If the NSC staff failed to consider alternative scenarios that might pose differing requirements, neither did it provide strategic guidance on various aspects of U.S. policy during the postwar period. Repeated requests for policy guidance from CENTCOM, Task Force IV, ORHA, and others went unanswered, leaving each agency to make its own assumptions about key aspects of the postwar period.¹⁴ Key questions, such as whether the U.S. postwar authority would be military or civilian in nature, went unanswered throughout the planning process. When the NSC finally did issue strategic guidance in late March 2003 (as discussed in Chapter Three), the war was already under way. As a result, the various planning processes that occurred throughout the U.S. government were neither coordinated nor guided by a set of consistent goals and objectives.

Above all, the NSC seems not to have mediated the persistent disagreement between the Defense Department and the State Department that existed throughout the planning process. Secretary of State Powell influenced a few key diplomatic decisions—notably the decision to take the case for war with Iraq to the United Nations in September 2002¹⁵—but the Defense Department controlled most planning decisions. Richard Haass, then the Director of Policy Planning at the State Department, later stated that he realized the decision to confront Iraq had already been made in July 2002, despite continuing opposition from State.¹⁶ As discussed in Chapter Three, State's main postwar planning effort, the Future of Iraq project, was largely ignored by the Defense Department throughout 2002. And as noted in Chapter Five, in February 2003 DoD prevented Tom Warrick, the study's leader, from working for ORHA.¹⁷

The Department of Defense was named the lead agency for postwar Iraq in January 2003, on grounds that the civilian and military authorities in postwar Iraq

¹⁴ See, for example, the discussion of CENTCOM's frustration with the lack of policy guidance in Mark Finceman, Robin Wright, and Doyle McManus, "Preparing for War, Stumbling to Peace," *Los Angeles Times*, July 18, 2003.

¹⁵ Woodward, especially pp. 148–153.

¹⁶ Haass stated that during a conversation with National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice held in the first week of July 2002, "I raised this issue about were we really sure that we wanted to put Iraq front and center at this point, given the war on terrorism and other issues. And she said, essentially, that that decision's been made, don't waste your breath . . . It was that meeting with Condi that made me realize it was farther along than I had realized." Nicholas Lemann, "How It Came to War," *The New Yorker*, March 31, 2003.

¹⁷ For more on tension between DoD and State, see Rieff, "Blueprint for a Mess."

would coordinate more effectively if they both reported to the Secretary of Defense, rather than having the civilian authorities reporting to State and the military authorities reporting to DoD. While this may have made sense in theory, it did not work in practice. DoD's understandable emphasis on military operations led it to form ORHA, the civilian planning agency, only eight weeks before combat operations began, and more than a year after CENTCOM began military planning for the war. But DoD lacked the expertise and personnel necessary to address the civilian aspects of reconstruction, and it did not possess enough bureaucratic leverage to compel other U.S. agencies to provide experienced personnel. DoD's lack of capacity for civilian reconstruction planning and execution continued to pose problems throughout the occupation period.

Security as the Key Postwar Task

The biggest failure of both military planning and the interagency process was the failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate aftermath of the war. Clearly, this failure stemmed directly from the assumptions identified at the beginning of this chapter: the Iraqi population would generally support the U.S. military presence, and the Iraqi police would maintain law and order throughout the country. Postwar planning did not account for the insurgency that emerged as soon as major combat ended and did not anticipate that all of Iraq's security structures, including the police, would essentially disintegrate and prove incapable of providing security.

The failure is all the more glaring for the presence of countering advice available to planners. The question of post-conflict security was addressed explicitly at the February 2003 rock drill, as discussed in Chapter Five, but was never satisfactorily resolved. Ron Adams, the deputy director of ORHA, later recalled that "There were some of us saying, right from the get-go, 'We think there's a troops-to-task mismatch here—I'm not sure there are enough troops here to maintain security.'"¹⁸ Meanwhile, General Anthony Zinni (ret.), the CENTCOM commander before General Franks, noted after the war that the warplans he developed for potential operations against Saddam did include enough forces for post-combat stability operations. Zinni argues that DoD leaders were "very proud that they didn't have the kind of numbers [of troops] my plan had called for. The reason we had those two extra divisions was the security situation. Revenge killings, crime, chaos—this was all foreseeable."¹⁹

In the event, Secretary Rumsfeld and General Franks chose to stop the flow of forces into Iraq sooner than their planners had envisioned, further reducing the

¹⁸ Michael Elliott, "So, What Went Wrong?" *Time*, October 6, 2003.

¹⁹ Fallows, p. 65.

forces available to provide security. As discussed in Chapter Two, senior commanders believed that forces would continue to flow into theater until after end-state conditions were met for both Phases III and IV. The decision to stop the flow of forces (notably the 1st Cavalry Division) into theater prior to that point was, in effect, a change to OPLAN 1003V. It further exacerbated a shortfall in the number of troops required to simultaneously complete Phase III and begin Phase IV operations.

Significantly, few military voices besides that of Army Chief of Staff Shinseki protested these force levels. Clearly one reason was that the military operated within the prevailing assumptions outlined earlier in this chapter, which did not identify security as a problem. Yet another part of the answer lies in the reluctance of the military to take responsibility for security and stabilization missions in the aftermath of major combat—though that reluctance was, in part, due to the failure to adequately resource Phase IV operations.

The CENTCOM commander, General Tommy Franks, unintentionally shows this reluctance in his memoirs. He mentions the importance of Phase IV throughout his book, but never identifies the specific mission that U.S. forces should have had during that time. To the contrary, he expresses the strong statement that his civilian superiors should focus on the postwar while he focused on the war itself.²⁰ He goes on to argue that civic action sets the preconditions for security rather than the other way around.²¹ And he justifies his decision to retire right after combat ended because the mission was changing and a new commander should be there throughout Phase IV.²² These statements reveal a mindset that sees major combat operations during Phase III as fundamentally distinct from Phase IV stability and reconstruction requirements.

We know now, of course, that the failure to plan for and adequately resource stability operations had serious repercussions that affected the United States throughout the occupation period and continue to affect U.S. military forces in Iraq today. Because the 3rd Infantry Division was not directed to establish law and order—and did not have sufficient capabilities to do so by itself—it stood aside while looters ravaged Iraq's infrastructure and destroyed the facilities that the military campaign took great pains to ensure remained intact, creating greater reconstruction

²⁰ Franks states, "While we at CENTCOM were executing the warplan, Washington should focus on policy-level issues . . . I knew the President and Don Rumsfeld would back me up, so I felt free to pass the message along to the bureaucracy beneath them: *You pay attention in the day after and I'll pay attention in the day of.*" Franks, p. 441. Emphasis in the original.

²¹ Franks writes, "As I had said throughout our planning sessions, civic action and security were linked—*inextricably* linked. There was a commonly held belief that civil action would not be possible in Iraq without security. I would continue to argue that there could be no security without civic action." Franks, p. 526. Emphasis in the original.

²² Franks, p. 530.

requirements than existed when major combat ended. Because U.S. forces have had to focus far more on providing security for U.S. personnel (both military and civilian) than on providing security for Iraqis, ordinary Iraqis started growing frustrated with the lack of law and order in their country soon after Saddam was removed from power.

This trend has only gotten worse since the insurgency began, as U.S. forces have had to assume that ordinary citizens may be potential belligerents and that civilians are often caught in the crossfire. A consistent majority of the Iraqi population identified security and safety as the most urgent issue facing Iraq throughout the occupation period.²³ The failure to stabilize and secure Iraq has therefore had the inadvertent effect of strengthening the insurgency, as Iraqis witness many of the negative effects of the U.S. military presence without seeing positive progress on the issues that matter to them most. The insurgency has also been aided by the failure of U.S. military forces to prioritize the mission of sealing the country's borders during the occupation period, which enabled critical foreign support to flow into Iraq.

Lessons for the Army

This experience provides several lessons for how the military in general, and the nation's ground forces in particular, can seek to avoid or at least ameliorate in the future the problems that it now faces in Iraq. Arguably, three of those lessons are particularly helpful in shaping a new approach to military planning aimed at improving post-conflict operations.

- First, it should be clear from U.S. interventions not just in Iraq, but in Afghanistan, Kosovo, and Bosnia, that wars do not end when major conflict ends. Wars emerge from an unsatisfactory set of political circumstances, and they end with the creation of new political circumstances that are more favorable to the victor—in this case, circumstances more favorable to U.S. interests. Creating those new circumstances may not involve continuing conflict, and even if conflict is involved, it may not be as intense as the counterinsurgency operations confronting U.S. forces in Iraq today. But given the likely security vacuum in the immediate aftermath of major conflict, planners cannot avoid considering a variety of possible missions and scenarios.

²³ This trend has continued since the June 28, 2004 transfer of authority. Results do vary somewhat by city. Between January and August 2004, the percentage of the population identifying safety and security as the most urgent issue averaged 63 percent in Baquba; 60 percent in Mosul; 53 percent in Baghdad; 47 percent in Najaf; and 30 percent in Basra. When asked "How safe do you feel in your neighborhood?" the number of respondents who answered "not very safe" or "not safe at all" averaged 63 percent in Basra; 58 percent in Baquba; 57 percent in Baghdad and Najaf; 46 percent in Mosul; and 33 percent in Karbala. See "Opinion Analysis," U.S. Department of State Office of Research, M-106-04, September 16, 2004, Appendix 6A.

- Second, these post-conflict missions will almost unavoidably fall to forces present on the ground at the time. To some extent the security missions that follow major conflict are legitimate tasks for ground forces that, by virtue of their possession of the instruments of violence, can impose security in such situations. But the absence of security makes it unlikely that the civilian organizations that would normally handle reconstruction tasks will be available quickly to take on those roles. In the immediate aftermath of major conflict, and perhaps for a good deal longer, "civilian" as well as "military" missions will fall to forces on the ground.
- Finally, it should be clear that the way the actual conflict unfolds greatly influences the situation that emerges and evolves after the major conflict ends. In order to provide security in the aftermath of Saddam's fall, the invading force needed more troops. These observations testify to the dangerous artificiality of the distinction between Phase IV and the phases that preceded it. They are not distinct phases; planning for them sequentially can produce unhappy outcomes.

These lessons have significance for the U.S. Army's Title 10 role of organizing, training, and equipping forces for use by combatant commanders in major conflicts. The Army must put real meaning into the phrase "full spectrum force." It must be able to fight and dominate an adversary in a major conflict. But as Iraq demonstrates, Army forces must also be prepared to provide security to a civilian populace, reconstitute and retrain local security forces, reconstruct infrastructure as necessary, escort children safely to school, perhaps even help clear raw sewage from the streets. They will usually do so in a cultural environment foreign to them, yet those missions will require them to have at least enough cultural awareness to avoid undermining the mission.

But the more crucial significance of these basic lessons comes at the level of military and strategic planning. Clearly these lessons produce a very different view of the military planning process than the one recorded in this report. Military planning must start with a view of the desired outcome of the war—not the outcome of major conflict, but the creation of the desired political circumstances that signal the true end of the war. They must do so both because their forces, and especially forces on the ground, will be intimately involved in creating those circumstances, and because the way in which military action unfolds will heavily shape subsequent developments.

One way to capture this lesson is to say that military planners must start with "Phase IV." A still more productive approach would be to dispense with phases, which inevitably produce sequenced plans that risk missing crucial connections from phase to phase. Planners must start with strategic guidance from the civilian leadership on where they want to be, strategically, when the war ends. They can then work backward to points of major conflict, shaping plans for those in ways that contribute to the larger and longer-term strategic goal.

Starting to plan in this way will ensure that "Phase IV" will not be ignored or underplayed in the planning process. As planning for OIF makes clear, it is essential that planners entertain a full array of possible scenarios for getting to that strategic end point. Even the most reasonable assumptions must be challenged, and hedging actions must be an integral part of the plan. Recognizing that military forces—largely U.S. Army forces—will play a role in these activities should give the combatant commander good reason to force this conversation into the planning process.

They may not have to "force" anything, of course. Every planning process is different, and many may be open to the kind of questions that were not seriously considered in planning for Phase IV of OIF. The point is that military commanders and planners have a right and a responsibility to raise questions about so-called post-conflict activity, the "stability operations" assumed to follow a major combat operation. At the very least, the way these questions are answered will shape plans for major combat operations. It may also be the case, as it has been in Iraq, that military forces will be engaged in fashioning a favorable political outcome to a particular conflict long after major fighting has ended.



80212251

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

FEB 22 2008

The Honorable Ike Skelton
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your January 22, 2008 letter concerning military construction in support of Army Growth. As you acknowledge in your letter, the Army is in the midst of a tremendous transformation – made possible only with the continued support of Congress.

You raise a very important issue with your concern about relocatable buildings. For the past four years, the Army invested in relocatable buildings only for urgent operational requirements. The use of relocatable buildings support the historic increase in our force structure and training capacity needed to support our Nation at war. Nevertheless, the Army's long-term objective is to eliminate all relocatable buildings and replace them with permanent facilities where there is a long-term requirement. At this time, 73 percent of the relocatable buildings in use have a permanent replacement project in the current Future Year Defense Program (FYDP), and 16 percent have permanent replacement projects developed and awaiting prioritization in the 2010-2015 FYDP. The remaining 11 percent do not currently have replacement projects developed. The Army plan is to have projects developed and prioritized in the Army's fiscal years 2010 to 2015 program for all relocatables that require replacement.

The Army made substantial improvements in our training barracks program. Our plan is to fully fund by 2015 and eliminate by 2017 all inadequate training barracks in order to improve quality of life of our Soldiers. We have programmed \$5 billion for training barracks improvements between 2007 and 2013 and will address the remainder in the 2014-2015 Program. Specifically at Fort Leonard Wood, 2,640 spaces have been funded in 2007 and 2008, and 12,045 are programmed for 2009 through 2013. The remaining 1,656 inadequate training barracks will be programmed in 2014 and 2015. Fort Leonard Wood has long been recognized as an important training base. The first modernized basic training complex was built at Fort Leonard Wood, and this complex has become the model for all Army training complexes.

The Army's use of relocatable buildings has been prudent. We will continue to program and budget sufficient funds for operations and maintenance of all facilities, permanent and temporary. Thank you for your leadership and for your continued support to our Soldiers and their Families.

Sincerely,

Pete Geren



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

FEB 22 2008

80212260

The Honorable Ike Skelton
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your January 29, 2008 letter concerning the action of the Army Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR) that set aside the 1944 court-martial conviction of Mr. (b) (6). Among other things, that action authorized Mr. (b) (6) back pay and allowances of \$725. The amount is based on the pay tables prevailing during the period covered by the correction.

I tasked our lawyers to find a way to provide additional compensation to Mr. (b) (6) and they were unable to find any way to do so. They concluded that the Department of Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) has no legal authority to pay interest or to adjust payments for inflation and that there is no other option to provide him additional compensation.

Based on the research of our legal staff, I am persuaded that a legislative solution is required. Senator Bill Nelson has introduced two bills (b) (6) and S. (b) (6) to provide such a solution. The Department of Defense presently is reviewing these bills.

As to the policy and cost implications of retroactively changing current policies, these will be addressed by the Department of Defense as these the policies extend to all of our Armed Forces.

Thank you for your continued support of our veterans.

Sincerely,

Pete Geren

Printed on Recycled Paper



THE CHIEF OF STAFF

80310335

MAR 07 2008

The Honorable Carl Levin
269 Senate Russell Office Building
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:


Thank you for taking the time to meet with me prior to our hearing on the Fiscal Year 2009 Defense Authorization Request. I appreciate your thoughts and advice as we address the many challenges that lie ahead. You asked me to follow up on two items during our meeting: next year's budget requirements based on a reduction of troops to 100,000 and upcoming costs of the Future Combat Systems.

Even if troop levels were reduced to 100,000 by the end of 2008, we would not expect to realize immediate savings in the Fiscal Year 2009 GWOT Supplemental. Although operating costs and military special pays would decrease as troop strength declines, we would face in the short term increased requirements to transport goods and equipment from theater, close some of our operating bases, reset equipment worn and damaged during the war, procure new equipment to replace battle-losses, and support our Soldiers and their Families upon redeployment. We are working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff to build Fiscal Year 2009 GWOT Supplemental estimates using projected deployment figures.

The funding profile for our Future Combat Systems Program has not changed from the Future Years Defense Plan for Fiscal Years 2009 to 2013. As Future Combat Systems capabilities are fielded, we will shift our resources from research and development to procurement of the actual systems. The Future Combat Systems is affordable; at its peak, it is about one-third of our research, development and acquisition budget. The nature of conflict is rapidly changing; this is why we must modernize your Army to provide Soldiers the right capabilities to fight and win in the 21st Century. Initial Future Combat Systems' capabilities are helping us do this today.

Our Fiscal Year 2009 budget, coupled with GWOT requests, provide the critical funding needed to sustain, grow, reset, transform and prepare your Army to meet the demands of the 21st Century. I look forward to continuing our work together to ensure your Army remains the best in the world at what it does.

Sincerely,



George W. Casey, Jr.
General, United States Army



UNITED STATES ARMY
THE CHIEF OF STAFF

80314762

The Honorable Carl M. Levin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for sharing your thoughts and advice during our hearing on the Fiscal Year 2009 Defense Authorization Request. I want to follow-up on two items you requested during the hearing: the impacts of providing an additional two brigade combat teams (BCTs) to Afghanistan; and funding for our Warrior Transition Units.

As global demand for Army BCTs decreases, we will be able to shorten Soldiers' deployments and increase the amount of time they spend at home between deployments. We are planning to reduce deployment lengths for Soldiers from 15 to 12 months later this year if the number of BCTs in Iraq is reduced. This plan will only be sustainable if the global demand for Army BCTs remains at or below pre-surge levels. Should the Army be required to provide an additional two BCTs to Afghanistan without a similar reduction elsewhere, we would be unable to achieve 12-month deployments as currently planned.

Over the last year and with Congress' support, we have rapidly improved care for our Wounded Warriors. We requested much of this funding in the Global War on Terror (GWOT) supplemental because of our need to respond immediately. With Congress' assistance, we are building facilities to support 35 Warrior Transition Units. Our Fiscal Year 2008 GWOT Supplemental request includes \$138M for this purpose. Once Congress completes its budget deliberations, we will be able to proceed with these important projects and finalize our remaining requirements for the Fiscal Year 2009 GWOT supplemental. In the long term, timely and predictable funding is critical to ensure quality care for our Wounded Warriors. Starting with fiscal year 2010, we plan to include Army Medical Action Plan requirements in our base budget request.

Our fiscal year 2009 budget, coupled with GWOT requests, provide the critical funding needed to sustain, grow, reset, transform and prepare your Army to meet the demands of the 21st Century. Your continued support will be essential. I look forward to continuing our work together in the coming months.

Sincerely,

George W. Casey, Jr.
General, United States Army



80410177

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

APR 25 2008

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510-6050

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your March 25, 2008 letter concerning Mr. (b) (6) and the treatment practices at the United States Disciplinary Barracks (USDB), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. I have enclosed a copy of the response Brigadier General Rodney Johnson, Provost Marshal General, sent to Mr. (b) (6).

Mr. (b) (6) alleges that as a result of his refusal to participate in recommended treatment, he was unable to have contact with his wife for 29 months. He also alleges that prisoners are maltreated and subjected to sexual humiliation.

Mr. (b) (6) was not denied family visitation based on his participation in treatment programs, but because of his violation of a non-contact order and security requirements. The non-contact order was issued in accordance with Department of Defense Instruction 1325.7 in which a facility commander may limit correspondence and visiting privileges for prisoners based on security requirements, such as coercion, intimidation, and collaboration between co-accused.

When Mr. (b) (6) arrived at the USDB on March 25, 2005, he was issued an order prohibiting contact with Ms. (b) (6), an Abu Ghraib co-accused, who was also convicted by court-martial for offenses to detainees. Mr. (b) (6) disobeyed the non-contact order, married Ms. (b) (6) by proxy, and then demanded contact with her because she was his wife. Based on Mr. (b) (6) continued pattern of manipulation and failure to comply with the non contact order, his visitation requests with Ms. (b) (6) were denied.

Mr. (b) (6) visitation privileges were granted on August 22, 2007 because he complied with the facility visitation procedures and Ms. (b) (6) court-martial was finalized resulting in her subsequent discharge from the Army.

The Disciplinary Barracks has a statutory responsibility to provide correctional rehabilitation and treatment. The Disciplinary Barracks offers an extensive sex offender treatment program using both individual and group therapy. All such treatment programs are strictly voluntary, and are for the benefit of the prisoners.

Thank you for your continued support to our Soldiers, their Families, and the Army.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Pete Geren", with a stylized, cursive script.

Pete Geren

Enclosure

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

APR 14 2008

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Levin:

Thank you for your request concerning issues raised in an article appearing in *The Denver Post* alleging that Soldiers assigned to Fort Carson's 3rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT) were deployed despite their "no go" medical status. These issues were initially raised during my testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 13, 2008.

On February 14, 2008 I directed the Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) to review the issues you presented. Prior to the hearing, the Commander, Fort Carson already had directed his Inspector General to review the installation's process for addressing Soldier pre-deployment medical issues and to determine if medically unfit Soldiers were deliberately deployed against medical advice.

At the hearing, you provided me a copy of an email that included information consistent with the allegations in the *Post* article. The DAIG reviewed the situation of the Soldier in question and determined that even though he had a medical issue that caused him to be redeployed shortly after he arrived in Kuwait, proper medical screening procedures were followed and he was not deployed improperly. The interim results from the Fort Carson IG review further indicate, however, that some Soldiers may have been improperly deployed because medical screening procedures were not completed before the Soldiers deployed. The DAIG is continuing to review these issues and the rest of the Fort Carson draft inspection report for accuracy and completeness.

I have directed DAIG to expand the scope of a Special Inspection of Army Mental Health Care to obtain an abbreviated but immediate review of issues associated with the deployment of Soldiers with medical issues and physician-prescribed profiles that limit their activities. In addition, I have directed DAIG to conduct an Army-wide inspection of the pre-deployment medical screening and decision making process. This review is in the planning stage and will take a comprehensive look at how commanders decide whether to deploy Soldiers with medical issues.

I will provide the results of DAIG's review of the Fort Carson issue, the Special Inspection of Army Mental Health Care, and the Army-wide Inspection of Pre-deployment Medical Screening and Decision Making Process to you upon their completion, but I wanted to provide you an interim report at this point.

Thank you for your continued support of our Soldiers, their Families, and the Army.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Pete Geren", with a stylized, flowing script.

Pete Geren



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

OCT 10 2008

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for bringing to my attention during the February 13, 2008 Senate Armed Services Committee hearing the allegations that Soldiers assigned to Fort Carson's 3rd Heavy Brigade Combat Team (HBCT), 4th Infantry Division were deployed despite their "no go" medical status. I appreciate the opportunity to provide you the results of the Army's investigation of these allegations.

The Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) has conducted a thorough inquiry into this matter. A detailed summary of the results of the inquiry is attached. In short, the DAIG found that:

- Soldiers at Fort Carson were processed properly by the Soldier Readiness Center medical providers,
- Commanders properly exercised their authority when determining whether to deploy their Soldiers, taking into account advice and recommendations from unit and installation medical providers,
- Commanders and medical providers were either unaware of the requirement to request a medical waiver or didn't understand the process for requesting a medical waiver, and
- The waiver request process itself requires further development, as no procedural guidelines have been published to date.

In other matters, the Special Inspection of Army Mental Health Care and the Army-wide Inspection of the Pre-deployment Medical Screening and Decision Making Process are still ongoing. I will provide the results of these inspections to you upon their completion.

Thank you for your inquiry into this matter and for your continued support of our Soldiers, their Families, and the Army.

Sincerely,

Pete Geren

Enclosure

Copy Furnished:
Senator Mitch McConnell

Summary of Department of the Army Inspector General Investigation

Issue One: That Soldiers assigned to 3rd HBCT, 4th Infantry Division were not properly screened for medical issues before deployment under Army Regulation 600-8-101, Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA Pam) 600-8-101, Personnel Processing (In-, Out-, Soldier Readiness, Mobilization and Deployment Processing), and Department of Defense Instructions (DoDI) 6490.03, Deployment Health:

A review of the deployment processing and medical files of Soldiers found non-deployable by the Fort Carson Soldier Readiness Center (SRC) indicated that all Soldiers were processed properly by SRC medical providers and staff. Initially, 90 Soldiers were identified as non-deployable – 54 Soldiers were eventually cleared for deployment by the SRC and/or medical providers, while 36 were not cleared by the SRC before deployment. These 36 Soldiers were cleared for deployment by their commanders who used a commander deployment authorization memorandum to document their consideration of the Soldiers' medical conditions and functional limitations.

Issue Two: That 3rd HBCT, 4th Infantry Division deployed Soldiers with medical and behavioral health issues in contravention of the Department of the Army Personnel Planning Guidance (PPG), Chapter 7; United States Central Command Modification 8, Tab A to the Operation IRAQI FREEDOM Operations Order (USCENTCOM Mod 8, Tab A to the Operation Iraqi Freedom Operations Order); AR 40-501, Standards of Medical Fitness; or Office of the Surgeon General (OTSG)/Medical Command (MEDCOM) Policy Memorandum 06-036:

The preponderance of the evidence indicates that commanders properly exercised their authority when determining whether to deploy their Soldiers, taking into account advice and recommendations from unit and installation medical providers. Before the deployment, commanders met with medical providers weekly, and in some instances daily, to discuss individual Soldier medical conditions and limitations. Commanders made deployment decisions concerning Soldiers with medical conditions on a case-by-case basis and assigned duties to such Soldiers based on their functional capabilities and limitations.

US Army MEDCOM policy provides that the commander decides whether an individual Soldier deploys (unless that Soldier is pregnant, HIV positive, or has Hepatitis B or C). Although *USCENTCOM Mod 8, Tab A* to the Operation Iraqi Freedom Operations Order imposed a medical waiver requirement in all other instances, this modification was relatively unknown and did not contain procedural guidance for processing waiver requests.

Historically, it is the commander's decision whether to deploy a Soldier. Once competent healthcare professionals have assessed a Soldier's medical condition and prescribed the Soldier's limitations, the commander is in the best position to determine whether that Soldier, operating within prescribed limitations, can make positive contributions to mission accomplishment.

Issue Three: That 3rd HBCT, 4th Infantry Division did not request medical waivers for Soldiers in accordance with the Under Secretary of Defense Policy Guidance for Medical Deferral Pending Deployment to Theater of Operation; MEDCOM Memorandum, dated April 24, 2007, Subject: Deployment Limiting Psychiatric Conditions and Medications; or United States Central Command Modification 8, Tab A to the Operation Iraqi Freedom Operations Order:

Testimonial and documentary evidence indicates that commanders and medical providers were either unaware of the requirement to request a medical waiver or didn't understand the process for requesting a medical waiver. Moreover, the waiver request process itself requires further development; to date no procedural guidelines have been published. This concern has been brought to the attention of the CENTCOM Surgeon.



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

APR 25 2008

80411690

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your March 17, 2008 letter concerning the Spring Valley Formerly Used Defense Site (FUDS). The Spring Valley FUDS represents a cleanup of hazards resulting from Army activities at the American University Experimentation Station from many years ago. The efforts by the Army on this project represent a responsible acknowledgement of the challenges posed by cleanup of an extremely complex legacy site.


Cleanup work at the Spring Valley FUDS is proceeding at a deliberate pace, with no shortage of funding. The fiscal year (FY) 2008 budget for Spring Valley is 38 percent larger than the 2007 budget. Additionally, \$11.2 million of the \$19.3 million budgeted for the project in FY 2008 has been devoted to American University (AU) projects. This includes work at both 4835 and 4825 Glenbrook Road, the AU Public Safety Building, and Hughes Hall. These figures include the \$3.2 million specifically provided under the Department of Defense Office of Economic Adjustment.

Communication with regulators and stakeholders, particularly AU, is frequent and ongoing. For example, overall project and site work schedules were recently adjusted in order to not interfere with spring athletic practices and special events at AU's request. The concerns and safety of the entire Spring Valley community are foremost in project planning and execution. The Army will continue to address concerns in a manner that is protective of human health and the environment.

Finally, it is notable that there have been no major new disposal areas or other areas of concern found at the Spring Valley FUDS in the past year. At the property currently owned by the Embassy of South Korea, follow-on remediation efforts are underway on portions of the property that were inaccessible at the time of previous investigations. The current effort was deemed necessary as a result of information obtained during an ongoing comprehensive review of historic records.

The Army looks forward to meeting with your staff to discuss the remaining tasks, including the 2011 timeline and completeness of the clean-up, and associated funding required to complete the remediation of the Spring Valley FUDS. Thank you for your committee's continued support of the FUDS program, and the Spring Valley project in particular.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Pete Geren", with a stylized, cursive script.

Pete Geren



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

APR 30 2008

80411749

The Honorable Ike Skelton
Chairman
House Armed Services Committee
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your March 26, 2008 letter concerning Army deployment policies and the specific concerns of Sergeant First Class (b) (6). I have enclosed a copy of the U.S. Army Human Resources Command's response to questions previously received from Sergeant First Class (b) (6).

The U.S. Army Human Resources Command currently is working with Sergeant First Class (b) (6) command to ensure he is assigned to a non-deployable unit upon his return from his current tour in Iraq. To that end, he will be reassigned to a Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) unit at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama with a report date on or before April 10, 2009.

Managing multiple deployments is one of the Army leadership's key concerns. I want to assure you that I understand and deeply appreciate the sacrifices that our brave Soldiers and their Families have made and will continue to make in the future. Sergeant First Class (b) (6) is to be commended for his own selfless service during four deployments.

Thank you for your continued support of our Soldiers, their Families, and the Army.

Sincerely,


Pete Geren

Enclosure

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SPECIFIC QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (Ref: SFC (b) (6))

Question 1:

How many people in my MOS and grade have 4 deployments already? Now let's be fair on the question. I am holding an E-8 slot and have been for my last two assignments. They may not want to promote me but by position that is the rank I hold so any reference should be to that rank not the E-7 I now hold!

Answer 1:

In order to provide maximum manning flexibility, HQDA manning guidance allows for assigning NCO's to positions one grade above, or, up to two grades below, their current grade. There are 2128 Soldiers in SFC (b) (6)'s MOS and grade. Of those, 1910 have deployed 1 time, 918 have deployed 2 times, 304 have deployed 3 times and 50 have deployed 4 or more times. Of the remaining 268 that have not deployed, 58 are preparing to deploy, 35 are not available for deployment (medical/legal), 92 are assigned to TOE units that are not currently slated for deployment, 21 are assigned to TDA (non-deploying) units, 11 are either drill sergeants or recruiters (non-deployable), and 1 is currently in school. With resetting units, at least 50% of Soldiers will remain in a given unit and over time, some Soldiers will have more deployments than others. Since 9-11, SFC (b) (6) has had 1 deployment of six months, 2 deployments of 12 months, and is currently deployed for up to 15 months.

Question 2:

If all deployments are suppose to be fair and equitable to all similarly qualified personnel why am I seeing people over here of the same rank and MOS on their first tour after almost 7 years into the war?

Answer 2:

Some Soldiers may deploy more than others for various reasons such as requirements, MOS and Skill set, unit deployment cycles. HRC's goal is to ensure that qualified Soldiers, who have not deployed, receive assignment to combat or duty in a hostile fire zone while maintaining all other Army mission requirements. Selection for reassignment is based on eligibility, manning priorities, and the needs of the Army. Additionally, personnel managers at the gaining command may reassign or realign in-bound Soldiers in order to meet the commands mission and objectives.

Question 3:

Why was I sent to a unit deploying when I was suppose to go to a unit at Fort Riley that was not scheduled to deploy as I was promised by HRC?

-- Continued on next page --

SPECIFIC QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (Ref: SFC (b) (6) Continuation)

Answer 3:

In order to provide adequate dwell time, HRC reassigned SFC (b) (6) from the 561st Combat Sustainment Brigade at Fort Campbell, Kentucky to the 3rd Brigade, 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley, Kansas in May 2007. The 3rd Bde, 1st ID was not scheduled to deploy.

- Upon arrival to Fort Riley, the 1st Infantry Division realigned SFC (b) (6) to their Combat Sustainment Brigade (a deploying unit). In accordance with HQDA manning guidance for Commands/Unit Commanders/Installation, Commanders can cross level Soldiers in Echelon Above Brigade (EAB) Combat and CS/CSS units to ensure deploying units are sufficiently manned. If cross level cannot achieve equal or greater fill level for deploying units, the Commands must notify HRC.

Question 4:

Why when I called HRC when I was at Fort Campbell they did not even know what battalion and unit I was in. 106th Transportation BN 102 QM Co.?

Answer 4:

HRC has access to all enlisted assignment information and should have been aware of SFC (b) (6) current assignment with the 106th Transportation BN, 102d QM Co.

Question 5:

Why when I called HRC and submitted a 4187 requesting a change of assignment with some where less likely to deploy was my request rudely ignored by them?

Answer 5:

SFC (b) (6) request was taken into consideration and he was assigned to a non-deploying unit. Selection for reassignment is based on eligibility, manning priorities, and the needs of the Army. Assignments requiring a permanent change of station are made to brigade or higher level commands based on assigned and projected strengths. In accordance with HQDA manning guidance for Commands/Unit Commanders/Installation, the local Commander can cross level Soldiers in Echelon above Brigade (EAB) Combat and CS/CSS units to ensure deploying units are sufficiently manned. The local commander has the authority to assign Soldiers from one unit to another based on mission requirements.

SPECIFIC QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS (Ref: SEC (b) (6) (continuation))

Question 6:

What is my next assignment likely to be when I return to Fort Riley? I will have about 55 months of combat time and would like to get an assurance in writing this time that says I will get a chance to take care of some issues that have been put off repeatedly to support the mission! I would like to have more than a promise because those are apparently not worth the breath that issues them.

Answer 6:

Sergeant First Class (b) (6) is on assignment instructions to Redstone Arsenal, Alabama with a report date of no later than April 2009.

Question 7:

Is there a plan in place to relieve some of the stress multiple deployments have caused? I asked this because there is no way all deployments have been fair as HRC and DA would like everyone to believe. There are a lot of people in the same boat I am. Right now, I may be the only one saying anything about it but it is and has been going on for years.

Answer 7:

HRC is committed to ensuring that Soldiers with no deployment experience are identified for deployment, consistent with current mission requirements and unique personnel needs. Despite every effort to ensure deployment equity, there are mission-related circumstances (as detailed above) that may result in multiple deployments. In order to mitigate the stresses of these multiple deployments, the Army has several programs in place to support Soldiers and Families at the installation level. Such as;

- Military Family Life Consultants provide reunion and reintegration support to Soldiers and their Families to reduce deployment stress.
- New Parent Support Program Home Visitors make home visits to support the needs and training of parents with children 0-3 years of age, and to identify Families at risk and reduce incidents of child neglect or abuse.
- The Family Advocacy Program provides education and prevention services that help Families cope with challenges before, during, and after deployment.
- Other programs include Virtual Family Readiness Groups, Employment Readiness Program, Army Integrated Family Support Network, and Army Family Team Building Training Program.



UNITED STATES ARMY
THE CHIEF OF STAFF

JUN 13 2008

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your June 2, 2008 letter concerning the US Army's Tank Automotive Research, Development, and Engineering Center (TARDEC). Over the past decade, our increasing investments in vehicle survivability, and power and energy, have benefited the TARDEC technology base. In Fiscal Year 2000 (FY00), the TARDEC technology "base" funding was roughly \$81 million. Our FY10 request would result in TARDEC technology "base" funding of \$152 million, resulting in a growth of 53 percent. This is 35 percent higher than the growth of the Army-wide Science and Technology program over the same time period.

The funding profile in TARDEC's base budget from FY09-10 that you noted is a result of TARDEC completing armor demonstrations in FY09. This will not limit TARDEC's ability to meet our science and technology needs in FY10. In fact, this funding profile is consistent with the natural ebb and flow of science and technology programs. As programs near completion, they typically do not require the same level of resources required during program initiation and ramp up. The US Army continues to value the important partnership between the US Army Research Laboratory (ARL) and TARDEC, particularly in the area of survivability. For this reason, we plan to increase TARDEC funding beginning in FY11 as the next wave of armor technologies begins transitioning from ARL to TARDEC for further maturation and development.

With our investments in science and technology, we will continue providing needed state-of-the-art technologies to our Soldiers. I look forward to continuing our work together to ensure your US Army remains the best in the world. Thank you for your sustained support of US Army modernization.

Sincerely,

*Am heading
to TACOM next week
and will take a
look at this while
I'm there.*

George W. Casey, Jr.
General, United States Army



80712447

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON
AUG 11 2008

The Honorable Ike Skelton
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your July 11, 2008 letter concerning the Committee's request for information and documents relating to the Army's decision to reassign the Director and Deputy Director of the Field Support Contracting Division and the subsequent decision to reimburse Kellogg, Brown and Root.

Upon receipt of your letter, we initiated a search for the information and documents you have requested, and will provide them to you as soon as possible. I also sent a team of Army officials to meet with your Committee's staff on July 14th to provide initial information concerning this issue.

I have directed the Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG) to inquire into the circumstances surrounding the use of RCI to review LOGCAP contracts. Furthermore, I have directed the DAIG to look into possible retaliatory actions against Mr. (b) (6) as reported in a New York Times article of June 17, 2008.

In a related matter, the Army's Criminal Investigation Division is working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Defense Criminal Investigative Service in an ongoing review of LOGCAP contract billings and payments. We will keep you advised of significant developments in all of these investigations.

If you have any questions about this matter, please contact Mr. Bernie Ingold at (703) 697-0278.

Thank you for your interest in this matter and for your continuing support for our Army.

Sincerely,

Pete Geren



81113008

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

DEC 23 2008

The Honorable Ike Skelton
Chairman
House Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your November 17, 2008 letter concerning Chief Master Sergeant (CMSgt) (b) (6) USAF, Retired, and her desire to have her son, Sergeant (b) (6) awarded the Purple Heart for injuries he received in Iraq. In November 2007, Representative Frank Wolf, on behalf of CMSgt (b) (6) submitted a request to the Military Awards Branch for Sergeant (b) (6) to receive the Purple Heart. The Military Awards Branch verified that Sergeant (b) (6) received the Purple Heart on November 9, 2007.

The Army regulation that governs the award of the Purple Heart, AR 600-8-22, *Awards and Decorations* (11 December 2006), gives Army commanders in the field the latitude to award Purple Hearts to Soldiers who suffer concussions or other TBIs. The regulation defines a wound as "an injury to any part of the body from an outside force or agent;" indicates that a physical lesion is not required, provided the wound for which the award is made "required treatment by medical personnel and records of [the] medical treatment . . . [are] made a matter of official record," and states that concussion injuries caused by enemy generated explosions "clearly justify award of the Purple Heart."

Army commanders in the field are routinely awarding Purple Hearts to deserving Soldiers with TBI. If an active-duty Soldier believes that he or she may be eligible for the Purple Heart for TBI, the Soldier may submit the appropriate medical documentation through command channels for consideration by the appropriate approval authority. Soldiers who have already separated from the Army may submit their request, along with their medical documentation, directly to the Military Awards Branch, US Army Human Resources Command.

Thank you for your inquiry into this matter and for your continued support of our Soldiers and their Families.

Sincerely,

Pete Geren



90814255

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

OCT 16 2009

The Honorable Ike Skelton
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman: *JS*

Thank you for your July 30, 2009 letter on behalf of Captain ^{(b) (6)} concerning Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) for Soldiers deployed to Kuwait as part of a Military Transition Team (MiTT).

Further examination of this matter revealed an inequality in the BAH eligibility of Soldiers without dependents who were deployed in a Permanent Change of Station (PCS) status to Kuwait to serve as part of a MiTT during the period April 2008 to July 2009. During this time period, the Army temporarily suspended Soldiers' ability to choose to PCS to a Continental United States (CONUS) location for a three-year tour, one of which would be served on Temporary Change of Station (TCS) orders in theater and two of which would be served in CONUS as a trainer in the MiTT training program. Soldiers were only able to PCS to Kuwait on a one-year, unaccompanied hardship tour.

The unintended consequence of this temporary suspension was to prevent Soldiers without dependents from being eligible to receive the BAH they would have been able to receive if they had been able to PCS to a CONUS location. Soldiers with dependents were able to receive BAH on behalf of their dependents, even though they were also on one-year, unaccompanied PCS orders to Kuwait.

In the interest of equity, I have directed the Acting Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Matters, Major General Gina Farrissee, to identify those Soldiers who deployed to Kuwait in a PCS status to serve on a MiTT during this period of temporary suspension. The Army will notify these Soldiers of their ability to seek redress through the Army's Board for Correction of Military Records (ABCMR). The ABCMR is aware of this issue and is standing by to review these applications and determine the eligibility for and repayment of the BAH these Soldiers otherwise would have received had they been afforded the option to PCS to a CONUS location and deploy to Kuwait on TCS orders.

Regarding your inquiry into the fairness of having all Soldiers deploy into theater on TCS orders, the Army decided to deploy MiTT Soldiers in a PCS status because it allowed Soldiers all the entitlements associated with PCS (e.g. relocating family members) while enabling CONUS commands to backfill deployed Soldiers and maintain

the Army's readiness. The enclosed information papers provide more information on this decision and the history of the MiTT program.

Thank you for bringing this issue to my attention and for your continued support of our Soldiers and their Families.

Thanks for your
vigilance for a
matter of significance
to single Soldiers -
Enclosures

Sincerely,



John M. McHugh

INFORMATION PAPER

DAPE-PRC
6 October 2009

SUBJECT: Entitlement to Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) for Service Member Without Dependents Assigned to Unaccompanied Tours

1. Purpose: Provide information concerning the BAH entitlement for single Soldier stationed in Kuwait and differences in entitlements for Permanent Change of Station (PCS) and Temporary Change of Station (TCS)

2. Facts:

a. Title 37, United States Code, Section 403, authorizes a BAH entitlement to all Soldiers in receipt of basic pay. However, Soldiers who are living in in-kind housing or Government-provided housing are not entitled to BAH.

b. The Army assigns a limited number of Soldiers to Kuwait in a Permanent Change of Station (PCS) status. These Soldiers are members of a Military Transition Team (MITT) who are then assigned in a TCS status to Iraq.

c. Soldiers permanently assigned to Kuwait serve on a one-year hardship tour and then report to a new assignment. Single Soldiers who PCS to Kuwait are provided in-kind housing and do not have a housing expense; consequently, these Soldiers are not eligible for either BAH or the Overseas Housing Allowance, which is only given to Soldiers who have a housing expense while assigned overseas. Married Soldiers continue to receive BAH on behalf of their dependents who may not accompany the Soldier to the hardship assignment.

d. At the inception of the MITT program the Army assigned these Soldiers to Kuwait using TCS. Married Soldiers who wished to have their dependents moved to a designated location for the duration of their unaccompanied tour, as is permitted for all other PCS hardship tours, were unable to do so under TCS. Hence, in 2006 the Army authorized MITT Soldiers the option to PCS to Fort Riley, Kansas or PCS to Kuwait. This option provided Soldiers the flexibility to move their family members to a designated location or be permanently assigned to the stateside installation responsible for training MITTs.

e. Soldiers who opt to PCS to Fort Riley serve a total of three years – one year on a MITT Tour, and the remainder of the tour at Fort Riley as MITT instructors. These Soldiers – both married and single – are entitled to the Fort Riley BAH for their entire tour length to include TCS to Iraq or Afghanistan.

DAPE-PRC

SUBJECT: Entitlement to Basic Allowance for Housing (BAH) for Service Member Without Dependents Assigned to Unaccompanied Tours

f. The Continental United States (CONUS) PCS option for MITT Soldiers was suspended from April 2008 to July 2009 due to the move of the MITT training mission from Fort Riley, Kansas, to Fort Polk, Louisiana. During that time, no Soldier could be assigned to an installation in CONUS as neither the MITT instructor positions nor command support had been fully established at Fort Polk.

g. The CONUS PCS option for MITT Soldiers was reinstated in August 2009 corresponding with the establishment of instructor billets and a support network at Fort Polk. This allowed Soldiers to be assigned to Fort Polk, receive the BAH rate for Fort Polk, and return to the installation to train future MITT Soldiers.

h. Single Soldiers who joined the MITT Teams during the time when the CONUS PCS option was suspended were only able to PCS to Kuwait for a one-year hardship assignment and were not eligible to receive full BAH. The Department of Defense (DOD) is precluded from changing orders for these Soldiers retroactively unless there is an obvious error in the order. In accordance with Comptroller General Opinion, B-191681, as well as the DOD Financial Management Regulation, orders may not be amended retroactively for the sole purpose of increasing or decreasing entitlements. Soldiers may seek redress through the Army's Board for Correction of Military Records for review and possible reinstatement of BAH entitlements.

(b) (6)

Approved by

(b) (6)

Director, Plans and Resources

INFORMATION PAPER

DAPE-MPE
06 October 2009

SUBJECT: Evolution of the Permanent Change of Station (PCS) Policy in Support of
USCENTCOM Training and Transition (TT) Teams

1. Purpose: Provide a synopsis of the development of the TT Assignment Policy.

2. Facts:

a. Prior to 2005, TT Teams operating in the CENTCOM AOR were resourced either by Soldiers already in theater (internally sourced) or by individual augmentation via the Worldwide Individual Augmentee System (WIAS). Army Commands were tasked to source teams and/or positions. Individuals and teams deployed on Temporary Change of Station (TCS) orders, normally with TDY en route for training at a designated CONUS Installation. This TCS methodology was neither desirable nor sustainable over the long term and does not take care of Soldiers and their Families. TCS status precluded the relocation of Family members and shipment of household goods at Government expense. Additionally, the strategy created a readiness issue for the tasked units as the Soldiers were TDY/TCS from the unit for extended periods of time while remaining assigned to the losing unit, masking the total demand on the Army and precluding the unit from requesting a replacement.

b. During 2005, Army leadership approved a long-term strategy to address the enduring USCENTCOM TT Team requirements, which involved creating a TDA structure and assigning Soldiers against the TDA authorizations on a Permanent Change of Station (PCS) basis. This system provides flexibility to the Army and maximizes benefits to Soldiers and Families. The methodology has several advantages for USCENTCOM, for Soldiers and Families, and for the Army. The requirements are documented in the personnel system and provide a visible base from which Soldiers can be selected from the Army at large, increasing the population considered for the assignments and thereby creating a more equitable system. Additionally, Soldiers can execute all entitlements associated with PCS (e.g., relocating Family members to a designated location; opportunity to negotiate a Homebase/Advanced Assignment Program [HAAP] assignment), and the Soldier's unit can place a demand on the system for a replacement.

c. On 18 April 2006, the Under Secretary of Defense (USD) concurred with the Army's initiative to PCS Soldiers to Kuwait for ultimate TCS to Iraq and Afghanistan to support the USCENTCOM TT Team mission. The Vice Chief of Staff, Army (VCSA) approved a course of action that permitted Soldiers to elect either PCS to Kuwait or PCS to the CONUS installation conducting the pre-deployment TT training, with a follow-on assignment as training cadre (formerly Fort Riley and now Fort Polk). On 21 April 2006, Army issued the first TT Assignment Policy guidance.

DAPE-MPE

SUBJECT: Evolution of the Permanent Change of Station (PCS) Policy in Support of
USCENTCOM Training and Transition (TT) Teams

d. The option to PCS to a CONUS installation was temporarily suspended due to the movement of the TT Training mission from Fort Riley, Kansas (FRKS) to Fort Polk, Louisiana (FPLA). This affected Soldiers reporting between April 2008 and April 2009. Soldiers reporting in this window would deploy from FRKS but return from deployment after the mission had moved to FPLA. Therefore, affected Soldiers were assigned PCS to Kuwait to afford maximum flexibility for follow-on assignments upon return from deployment. The assessed impact was minimal given the historical evidence that over 90% of Soldiers had selected PCS to Kuwait when both options were available, including the majority of single Soldiers.

e. An itemized timeline depicting salient dates and remarks follow:

(1) 8 Feb 08 – DCS, G-1 requested USD(P&R) approve stationing in Kuwait to allow TTs to PCS to Kuwait (PCS Kuwait established to provide expanded entitlements to Soldiers and permit losing organizations to request backfill).

(2) 18 Apr 08 – USD(P&R) approved PCS to Kuwait (up to 4,000 TT Soldiers).

(3) 21 Apr 08 – DMPM issued first TT Assignment Policy Guidance to AHRC (incorporates guidance from VCSA to allow PCS Kuwait or PCS FRKS; PCS FRKS facilitates assignment of Soldiers with TT experience to the training cadre).

(4) 22 Jan 08 – DMPM issued updated TT Assignment Policy Guidance (permits TT Bench Soldiers to elect PCS Kuwait; clarifies procedures for Soldiers returning for retirement/separation after TT assignment; suspends option to PCS CONUS from Apr 08-Jul 09 due to mission move from FRKS to FPLA—Soldiers reporting for training in Apr 08 would redeploy o/a Jul 09, at which time training cadre disbands at FRKS; beginning with first class reporting to FPLA, CONUS option is reinstated).

(5) 5 Mar 08 – HQDA EXORD for move of TT Training Mission from FRKS to FPLA issued by ALARACT.

(6) 18 Nov 08 – DMPM issued updated TT Assignment Policy Guidance (reinstates option to PCS CONUS (FPLA) effective with first class reporting to FPLA (o/a 1 Aug 09); clarifies procedures for stabilization of Soldiers electing PCS FPLA; clarifies reassignment and separation procedures for Soldiers returning from PCS Kuwait; updates administrative information).

(7) 1 May 09 – DMPM issued updated TT Assignment Policy Guidance (reinstates option to PCS CONUS (FRKS) for Soldiers reporting between effective date (1 May 09) and first class reporting to FPLA (1 Aug 09); all Soldiers reporting on or after 1 Aug 09 have option to PCS Kuwait or PCS FPLA).

LTC (b) (6)
Approved by: COL (b) (6)



91213129

**SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON
FEB 17 2010**

The Honorable Ike Skelton
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates asked me to respond on his behalf to your December 10, 2009 letter regarding comments on training and equipment that you received from Soldiers in Italy and Germany. Like you, the Army continually solicits feedback from our Soldiers, and these observations provide the basis for improvements to our combat preparedness. Our top priority is to provide Soldiers the best equipment and training available, and I appreciate the opportunity to address your concerns.

a. Rucksacks

Army large rucksacks and small assault packs are collectively known as the Modular Lightweight Load-carrying Equipment (MOLLE). The current MOLLE system was selected after years of extensive design and testing that leveraged the innovations of the commercial market. Post-combat surveys and other feedback lead the Army to believe a vast majority of Soldiers are still satisfied with the MOLLE system. However, to further enhance the modularity and flexibility of the MOLLE, the Army plans to begin fielding both the Medium Rucksack and the Tactical Assault Panel in Fiscal Year 2010. These improvements will provide Soldiers with additional options to tailor the equipment and the load for a particular mission.

b. Training and Readiness

The Army does not move Soldiers directly from basic training to a deployment cycle. Following basic training, all Soldiers attend Advanced Individual Training, focusing on their military operational specialties and further preparing them to be vital assets within their units. Soldiers are then assigned to a unit, where they receive further collective training and mentoring by our strong non-commissioned officer corps. Finally, deploying units will complete a Mission Rehearsal Exercise and multiple classes specifically tailored for a deployment to the Central Command Area of Responsibility (AOR). I can assure you that our Soldiers are prepared to fight and succeed on the battlefield.

c. Camouflage

The major challenge with camouflage is that it is highly optimized to a specific background. In Afghanistan Soldiers may move between and operate in widely variant environments including mountains, deserts, wooded and urban areas. Although the Army has not received a specific request from combat commanders, we have implemented a plan to

examine the need for an Army Combat Uniform (ACU) camouflage pattern specific to the Afghanistan operating environment. We will make a decision within the next month on the way ahead for the production and fielding of an alternative ACU in the Afghanistan AOR.

d. Uniform Durability


Soldiers do not have to pay out of pocket nor use their Clothing Replacement Allowance (CRA) to replace uniforms worn out in theater. Deployed Soldiers are authorized to use the Army Direct Ordering system and direct exchange at the supporting Central Issue Facility to sustain Fire Resistant ACUs and other Organizational Clothing and Individual Equipment. To improve durability and functionality, the Army has made over 26 improvements to the ACU since the initial fielding in June 2004 and continues to investigate and implement further enhancements.

e. M4 Rifle

The Army has made over 60 materiel improvements to the M4 since its introduction into the force and will continue to do so. These multiple enhancements have resulted in a weapon that exhibits a demonstrated reliability of 3,600 Mean Rounds Between Stoppages (MRBS) against a user-defined requirement of 600 MRBS. While modernizing the M4 inventory, the Army is simultaneously developing a new carbine requirement and program. The carbine requirement – developed with input from Warfighters, industry, and Congressional Staff – is currently under Army Senior Leadership review. The Army anticipates having an approved requirement and release of a request for proposal within this Fiscal Year. In the meantime, the Army will solicit a full and open competition for an improved M4 carbine.

Thank you again for bringing these matters to our attention and for your continued support of our Soldiers.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John M. McHugh". The signature is stylized with a large, sweeping initial "J" and a long horizontal stroke at the end. Below the signature, the name "John M. McHugh" is printed in a standard black font.

cc:
The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon
Ranking Member



110313108

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

MAR 30 2011

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Thank you for your March 16, 2011 letter concerning EOD Technology, Inc. (EODT) and its association with the Army. I appreciate the opportunity to provide you further information about the risk reduction efforts Army has implemented, EODT's status as an Army contractor following a raid by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Ambassador Dailey's contract with the Army.

Regarding the risk reduction efforts that have been implemented, as you know, the January 15, 2011 memo issued by the Commanding General of the U.S. Central Command Joint Theater Support Contracting Command highlighted the renewed emphasis on the evaluation, award and administration of all contracts utilizing private security contractors (PSC) in theater. Additional procedures implemented by the Senior Contracting Official in Afghanistan (SCO-A) require his approval of all new PSC contracts, extensions to existing contracts or exercise of option periods on existing contracts. This ensures that all new PSC contract awards have been vetted through the Joint Contingency Contracting System (JCCS) using the International Security Assistance Force Joint Command Process.

Every firm must also be licensed by the Afghanistan Ministry of the Interior. Any company that fails to pass the vetting process is not considered responsible and is ineligible for award.

Risk reduction efforts have also focused on improving past performance reporting mechanisms in theater. I am pleased to inform you that the JCCS was updated on March 5, 2011 and is now capable of sharing past performance information for PSC firms operating in theater. Previously, this reporting system was ineffective due to such issues as band-width capability in theater. The update to JCCS is proving to be successful; during the first week after the update, fifty percent of the reports entered into JCCS were on PSC past performance.

The SCO-A also works closely with the Task Force SPOTLIGHT/Armed Contractor Oversight Directorate (ACOD). ACOD provides information on PSC

compliance to the contracting agencies operating in Afghanistan. This information is used when considering contract awards to ensure compliance with contract and Central Command Army Policy requirements, including the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker enrollment, biometric enrollment, training, arming rosters, arming authorizations and performance.


Since the issuance of the January 15, 2011 memorandum, no new PSC contract awards have been granted by the Regional Contracting Centers under SCO-A. Only options and extensions to existing PSC contracts in Afghanistan have been authorized. In each case, the performance of the contractor was evaluated and considered acceptable to both the customer and the contracting officer. SCO-A also continues to work with the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) to improve contractor compliance, with the goal of delegating all PSC contracts to DCMA for contract administration.

Regarding EODT's status as an Army contractor following the December 8, 2010 DHS and ICE raid on the company's Tennessee headquarters, the Army has received no communications from any other federal agency that would prompt suspension or debarment actions. The Army's Procurement and Fraud Branch has not received any notice of a pending criminal matter involving EODT, including why the raid was conducted or what was found. The Procurement and Fraud Branch does not receive notice of criminal cases that are under seal or information that is the subject of a Grand Jury inquiry. Should a criminal case against EODT be unsealed or a criminal indictment or information be filed against the company, the Procurement and Fraud Branch will then be able to take appropriate action, to include possibly recommending a suspension of EODT to the Army suspension and debarment official.

Regarding Ambassador Dailey, he served as a subcontractor on a contract between the Army and Halfaker and Associates, LLC. Ambassador Dailey did execute a non-disclosure agreement which precluded him from sharing information gained on the contract with EODT. Enclosed is a copy of the Army's contract with Halfaker and Associates, LLC.

Thank you for your continued support of our Soldiers and our Army.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "John M. McHugh", with a stylized flourish at the end.

John M. McHugh

Enclosure



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

MAR 21 2013

The Honorable Howard P. "Buck" McKeon
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am pleased to provide this initial report on the Army's Time Sensitive/Mission Critical airlift requirements, as required by Section 112 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.


Currently, the execution of Army Time Sensitive/Mission Critical airlift requirements are guided by the execution of a Memorandum of Agreement (September 2009) and a supporting Concept of Employment between the Army and Air Force, which were established to satisfy an intra-theater airlift capability gap. The Concept of Employment has resulted in meeting Army requirements. In addition, the Army and the Air Force review this document biennially to determine the need for continuation, modification, or termination of the agreement.

The Concept of Employment is the only document that defines "Time Sensitive/Mission Critical" requirements. This term does not reside in Air Force, Army, or Joint doctrine. Additionally, per the Concept of Employment, Time Sensitive/Mission Critical missions are only executed in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility. Under the Memorandum of Agreement and the Concept of Employment, the movement of cargo and personnel conducted by the Army's organic assets, which are primarily rotary wing, are not considered Time Sensitive/Mission Critical. Similarly, cargo movements outside of theater are not considered Time Sensitive/Mission Critical. The operational commander is the authority that determines how and when to employ all aircraft in theater, to include supporting Time Sensitive/Mission Critical requirements, as the mission dictates. Time Sensitive/Mission Critical has not been formally set in the training or non-combat environments.

In order to best meet the reporting requirements outlined in the FY 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, the Army will consolidate existing data and request additional information from deployed forces. I anticipate a more informative report, using data from missions executed within the scope of the Time Sensitive/Mission Critical Concept of Employment, by October 31, 2013.

Thank you for your continued support of our Army and our Soldiers.

Sincerely,


John M. McHugh



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

MAR 21 2013

The Honorable James Inhofe
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Inhofe:

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
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In order to best meet the reporting requirements outlined in the FY 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, the Army will consolidate existing data and request additional information from deployed forces. I anticipate a more informative report, using data from missions executed within the scope of the Time Sensitive/Mission Critical Concept of Employment, by October 31, 2013.

Thank you for your continued support of our Army and our Soldiers.

Sincerely,



John M. McHugh



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

MAR 21 2013

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am pleased to provide this initial report on the Army's Time Sensitive/Mission Critical airlift requirements, as required by Section 112 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.


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The Concept of Employment is the only document that defines "Time Sensitive/Mission Critical" requirements. This term does not reside in Air Force, Army, or Joint doctrine. Additionally, per the Concept of Employment, Time Sensitive/Mission Critical missions are only executed in the U.S. Central Command Area of Responsibility. Under the Memorandum of Agreement and the Concept of Employment, the movement of cargo and personnel conducted by the Army's organic assets, which are primarily rotary wing, are not considered Time Sensitive/Mission Critical. Similarly, cargo movements outside of theater are not considered Time Sensitive/Mission Critical. The operational commander is the authority that determines how and when to employ all aircraft in theater, to include supporting Time Sensitive/Mission Critical requirements, as the mission dictates. Time Sensitive/Mission Critical has not been formally set in the training or non-combat environments.

In order to best meet the reporting requirements outlined in the FY 2013 National Defense Authorization Act, the Army will consolidate existing data and request additional information from deployed forces. I anticipate a more informative report, using data from missions executed within the scope of the Time Sensitive/Mission Critical Concept of Employment, by October 31, 2013.

Thank you for your continued support of our Army and our Soldiers.

Sincerely,


John M. McHugh



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

MAR 21 2013

The Honorable Nita M. Lowey
Ranking Member
Committee on Appropriations
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Lowey:

I am pleased to provide this initial report on the Army's Time Sensitive/Mission Critical airlift requirements, as required by Section 112 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013.


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Sincerely,



John M. McHugh



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

MAR 21 2013

The Honorable Harold Rogers
Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

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Thank you for your continued support of our Army and our Soldiers.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, which appears to read "John M. McHugh", is written over a vertical line. To the right of the signature is a large, stylized flourish or checkmark-like mark.

John M. McHugh



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

MAR 21 2013

The Honorable Richard C. Shelby
Vice Chairman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Shelby:

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
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Sincerely,



John M. McHugh



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

MAR 21 2013

The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski
Chairwoman
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Madam Chairwoman:

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
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John M. McHugh



SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON

MAR 21 2013

The Honorable Adam Smith
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Representative Smith:

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
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